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It is hard to let old beliefs go. They are familiar. We are 
comfortable with them and have spent years building 
systems and developing habits that depend on them. Like a 
man who has worn eyeglasses so long that he forgets he has 
them on, we forget that the world looks to us the way it does 
because we have become used to seeing it that way through 
a particular set of lenses. Today, however, we need new 
lenses. And we need to throw the old ones away. 
--Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World 
In the biological universe, however, perception is at 
the center. And it can--indeed it must--be trained and 
developed. We do not hear "C" "A" "T"; we hear "cat." 
--Peter F. Drucker, The New Realities 
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According to the longitudinal survey results annually conducted 
by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, American attitudes toward Japan as a 
dependable ally began deteriorating in the middle of the 1980s. In the 
same decade, the Japanese economy received heavy coverage from the 
U.S. media. 
Manheim positions valence--"the general sense of favor, neutrality, 
o r  disfavor associated with the portrayal of a given subject" in 
transference of general negativeness to the public--as one of the three 
important dimensions of the media agenda. In this sense, it was 
hypothesized that the three American news magazines (i.e. Time, 
Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report) may have intensified the 
negativeness of their coverage of Japanese economic activities in the 
1 986-1 990 period. 
Also, subscription circulation indicates the amount of financial 
resources available for deeper investigation that may eliminate 
unbalanced coverage. Thus, it was predicted that the investigative and 
reporting performance would have been more balanced in the order of 
Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report. 
From the agenda-setting standpoint, only the number of "war1'- 
related words the media often used showed a significant increase for the 
1986-1990 period. The causal direction from the media to the public 
remains unclear in this research. Nevertheless, assuming the existence of 
this causality based on the public's heavy dependence on the media, the 
choice of language may affect the transferability of negativeness as well 
as the public issue salience. On average, the public was expected to see 
"waru-related words more than twice both per article and per page in  the 
1986-1990 period. The calcified imagery of economic "wars" that 
connotes mutual antagonism seems to underlie the public's general 
perception of Japan as an "economic threat." 
On the other hand, subscription circulation difference had no 
significant impact on the performance of the three news magazines for 
all the three dependent variables. The most important finding is that 
all these magazines offered a balanced presentation of opinions whether 
on  an attributed or unattributed basis. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
This research is concerned with two issues: changes in the three 
U.S. news weeklies' (i.e. Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World 
Report) coverage of the Japanese economy between 1981 and 1990; and 
differences in content of stories in each publication. The media, as 
liaisons between reality and the public, daily supply society with a 
variety of information passed through their discriminatory filters which 
have the power to affect the public's perception. In this respect, based 
on agenda-setting research, it can be conjectured that a certain direction 
(i.e. favorability or unfavorability) of the media's coverage has been 
changed or intensified, if changes in the direction of public opinion on 
the issues the media have dealt with are observed. 
As for Japanese economic issues, there is period correspondence of 
two trend changes--American public opinion of Japan and U.S.-Japanese 
economic realities around the years 1985 and 1986. It can be inferred, 
therefore, that comparison of media coverage between 198 1-1 985 and 
1986-1 990 will show significant changes. Also, because of each 
magazine's limitation of financial resources, it is predictable that these 
three news weeklies differ in the way they covered this topic. 
In the middle of the 1980s, American favorable opinion of Japan 
started deteriorating with the apex of favorable opinion occurring in 
1985. Figure 1 shows the longitudinal trend of American attitudes 
toward Japan as a dependable ally (Gallup and Newport, 1991, p. 1 1 ). 
The increase in unfavorable opinion closely correlates with the decrease 
in favorable opinion, which means the sustainability of favorability is 
relatively weak. Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient 
indicates a strong, negative linear association between the increase in 
Figure 1 : Japan a Dependable Ally--Trend 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
( Y e a r )  
Source: Japanese Foreign Ministry 
unfavorable opinion and the decrease in favorable opinion in the 1985- 
91 period (r = -.988). This signifies the comprehensive deterioration of 
Americans' favorable attitudes toward Japan. 
At the same time that American opinion of Japan deteriorated, 
US.-Japanese economic realities also revealed conspicuous changes. 
During the decade of the 1980s, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan 
lingered at tens of billions of dollars, and Japanese direct investment in 
the United States increased rapidly. As the economic visibility of Japan 
became remarkably pronounced not only in the United States but also in 
the world, diverse new negative opinions of Japan and its people 
emerged among Western opinion leaders. Imidas ( 199 I), a multi- 
information dictionary published annually in Japan, defines this 
phenomenon as "revisionism": 
With the end of the U.S.-Soviet cold war, the threat of Japan 
has become felt strongly in the United States, instead of that 
of the [former] Soviet Union, and the 'revisionism on Japan' 
has come into birth. The advocates of this doctrine are 
called 'revisionists.' The intense consciousness of U.S.- 
Japanese conflicts has turned these 'revisionists' into 'Japan- 
bashers.' In U.S. history, it is a repeatedly observed 
phenomenon that revisionism comes out against 
orthodoxism and changes in political power and policy are 
facilitated. (p. 374: translation) 
The gist of "revisionism on Japan" is a repudiation of the 
traditionally sustained premise that the United States and Japan both 
believed in democracy, exercised a free market economy, and consisted 
of more or less similar societies. The supposition of the two countries' 
political, economic, and cultural similarities had motivated them to 
hold bilateral trade negotiations such as SII (Structural Impediments 
Initiatives) to resolve their economic disputes (Imidas, 199 1, p. 13 5 8). 
The two above-mentioned underlying macroeconomic factors--the U.S. 
trade deficit with Japan and the Japanese direct investment in the 
United States--have been frequently discussed by various politicians and 
economists. 
Figure 2 shows the changes in Japan's trade balance with the 
United States from 1981 to 1992 (Japan External Trade Organization 
[JETRO], 1991a, p. 32; 1992a, p. 56; 1993, p. 56). According to the 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the U.S. 
trade deficit with Japan before 1981 remained under $10 billion with 
Figure 2: Changes in Japan's Trade Balance 
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the only exception being the year 1978. In addition, the 1974 Japanese 
trade surplus with the United States was as small as $100 million (S. K. 
Johnson, 1988, p. 134). 
In the 1980s, the momentous milestone was the Plaza Accord 
reached by the G5 nations--the United States, Japan, former West 
Germany, France, and England--in September of 1985. According to this 
agreement, these five nations would cooperate to stabilize the value of 
the dollar in a predetermined "low" range relative to foreign currencies 
(e.g. $1 = 140-160 yen) in order to redress the fact that foreign exchange 
rates did not reflect each nation's economic performance and 
protectionism was prevailing worldwide (Imidas, 1991, p. 60). U.S. 
products were supposed to gain more price competitiveness in the world 
market, and thus, the U.S. trade imbalance, especially with Japan, was 
expected to be ameliorated. Looking at Figure 2, however, the year 1986 
seems to have spawned unexpected results in the following two aspects: 
(1) In spite of the Plaza Accord, the 1986 Japanese trade surplus with 
the United States marked the highest level at that point with a roughly 
30% increase from 1985; (2) Since 1986, the Japanese trade surplus with 
the United States has been stabilized at a relatively high level. 
The devaluation of the dollar did not serve to sharply shrink the 
Japanese trade surplus with the United States simultaneously. Bergsten 
and Cline ( 1987) argue that an absolute improvement in trade account 
positions by currency changes traditionally takes 12 to 18 months 
because of three lags: "the lag from change in exchange rate to change in 
prices of traded products, the lag from this change in price to alterations 
in demand patterns and production runs, and the lag from changes in 
orders to actual shipments and inclusion in the published statistics" (p. 
147). 
Bergsten and Cline ( 1987) believe that currency changes work to 
rectify trade imbalances from the long-term viewpoint. They judge that 
the main cause behind the growing US.- Japanese trade imbalance has 
been the past overvaluation of the dollar (p. 50). Because they found 
little evidence for the major role of Japanese protection in this 
imbalance, and the trend of the dollar-yen exchange rate fluctuated as 
closely as their recommended equilibrium rate at the point of the year 
1987, they predicted that reduction in the U.S. trade deficit with Japan 
could be "some $30 billion" (p. 148). Despite the sustained depreciation 
of the dollar since then, even the largest discrepancy in trade deficit, 
which was between 1987 and 1990, was merely $14.1 billion. Moreover, 
it started resurging in 1991. 
According to Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. (1989), former Counselor for 
Japan Affairs to the Secretary of Commerce from 1983 to 1986, the U.S. 
administration followed "the neoclassical economic theory that currency 
devaluation would reduce U.S. imports by increasing their prices and 
spur exports by reducing theirs" (p. 65). He concludes that this theory 
does not work for the following four reasons: ( 1) substantial reduction in 
costs of most of Japan's raw material inputs, particularly oil, which are 
priced in dollars; ( 2 )  Japan's cost-cutting efforts and transfer of 
manufacture of many labor-intensive, low-value added components to 
Southeast Asian countries; (3) continued imperviousness of Japan's 
home market to foreign goods; (4) the status quo that the United States 
no longer manufactures a large number of products such as VCRs, 
ceramic chip packages, radios, and cameras, which makes imports 
indispensable to the U.S. economy (pp. 66-67). 
Meanwhile, the depreciation of the dollar invited the excessively 
drastic influx of direct investment from Japan into the United States. 
Figure 3 presents the trend of Japanese direct investment in the United 
States (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1991, p. 105; 1993, pp. 179, 184). 
Japanese net direct investment on the balance totaled $81.8 billion, or 
20.6% of total foreign investment by 1990, whereas the 1981 counterpart 
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was merely $7.7 billion, or 7.1% of the total. As far as the period 
between 1981 and 1990 is concerned, the tendency of annual Japanese 
direct investment turned into a steady increase from 1986 on, with the 
only exception being the slight 1990 decrease, contrary to its constant 
fluctuation until 1985. Figure 3 clearly reveals that most of the 
Japanese direct investment occurred in the latter half of the 1980s. For 
instance, the 1986-1990 period takes more than three quarters of the 
$8 1.8 billion on a historical-cost basis. Especially in the years 1988, 
1989, and 1990 respectively, the figure on a yearly basis was close to $20 
billion, which simply indicates the tremendous amount of newly created 
Japanese direct investment in the United States; the combined figure for 
these three years was $53.3 billion. Incidentally, the 1988 figure was 
almost double that of the previous year. 
In a sense, the U S .  exchange rate policy seems to have become 
double-edged. This exchange rate trade-off relationship between the 
expected repressing effect on the U.S. trade deficit with Japan and the 
facilitating effect on the inflow of Japanese direct investment into the 
United States is unequivocally targeted by Kenichi Ohmae ( 1990), 
managing director of McKinsey & Company, Japan, a subsidiary of an  
international management consulting company, as follows: 
The Plaza agreement in 1985 accelerated this process of 
investment. At the strong request of U.S. Treasury Secretary 
James Baker, the value of the dollar was lowered to make 
American industrial goods more competitive. This was a 
strategy focused only on the nation's trade deficit. As 
discussed earlier, you cannot, however, make only certain 
things cheaper when you adjust a country's exchange rate. 
American grains and scientific instruments may have 
become more competitive externally by making the dollar 
cheaper, but so have American real estate, companies, and 
buildings. So, to take advantage of these bargains, foreign 
countries are now investing even more dollars than they 
accumulated through trade. (p. 15 1 ) 
Ohmae (1990) views the U.S. government's exchange rate policy as 
a fiasco, because the real meaning of adjusting the value of the dollar 
lower to rectify the trade imbalance is nothing more than "printing more 
greenbacks to purchase the same amount of goods" as long as U.S. 
domestic needs for foreign products and components exist ( p. 1 3 9). One 
recent convincing example may be that despite President Clinton's 
support of "strong" yen in early 1993 and the subsequent steep 
depreciation of the dollar due to general sensitivity of the world 
currency market to high-ranking political figures' comments, the U.S. 
1993 trade deficit with Japan soared to $50.2 billion, an approximately 
15% increase from the previous year. Although the Japanese imports 
from the United States increased to $55.2 billion, its exports marked a 
record $105.4 billion in the history of U.S.-Japanese trade relationship, 
an  almost $10 billion increase from 1992 (JETRO, 1994, Telephone 
interview). In neither foreign trade nor direct investment does 
adjustment of the value of the dollar seem to be working as U.S. policy 
makers expected. 
The media have frequently discussed changes in the two 
aforementioned macroeconomic realities--the U.S. trade deficit with 
Japan and Japanese direct investment in the United States, which 
identify the expansion of the U.S.-Japanese bilateral economic 
relationship in a sheer economic context. Meanwhile, American public 
opinion of Japan deteriorated. Were the media setting the agenda for 
the American public regarding Japanese economic activities? 
L i t e r a t u r e  R e v i e w  
Agenda S e t t i n g  
McCombs and Shaw's 1972 research was the first to systematically 
study the agenda-setting hypothesis. In this study, McCombs and Shaw 
( 1972) hypothesized that " the mass media set the agenda for each 
political campaign, influencing the salience o f  attitudes toward the 
political issues" ( p. 1 7 7). Their research showed only statistically 
significant high correlation between media and public agendas, lacking 
in corroboration of causality. However, they (1 972) emphasize the 
plausibility of their hypothesis because of the following reasons: 
. . . few directly participate in presidential election 
campaigns, and fewer still see presidential candidates in 
person, the information flowing in interpersonal 
communication channels is primarily relayed from, and 
based upon, mass media news coverage. The media are the 
major primary sources of national political information; for 
most, mass media provide the best--and only--easily 
available approximation of ever-changing political realities. 
(P* 185) 
The very nature of agenda-setting theory in general converges into 
Cohen's (1963) famous statement that the press "may not be successful 
much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think aboull(p. 13). As is 
obvious in the McCombs and Shaw's study, however, high correlation 
between media and public agendas alone cannot clarify whether the 
causal direction of agenda setting is from the media to the public or vice 
versa. To obtain more obvious evidence of the causality, some 
experimental research designs have been constructed. For instance, 
Iyengar, Peters and Kinder (1982) manipulated the agendas of television 
. network newscasts and examined how respondents changed their views 
of issues. By playing up  or down certain issues, they found evidence that 
public ratings fluctuated in response to those manipulated newscasts; 
heavier media coverage of a particular issue led to the increase in the 
public importance rating on the issue. They conclude, "When news 
presentations develop priorities, even if rather subtle ones as in our 
experiments, viewers' beliefs are affected--and affected again as new 
priorities arise" ( p. 855). 
Yet, no researcher contends that "agenda-setting is an  influence 
process operating at all times and all places in all people" (Protess and 
McCombs, 199 1, p. 98). The existence of "contingent conditions," which 
affect the increase or decrease in media's agenda-setting influence in real 
settings, makes it difficult to verify the media's pure effect on public 
agenda salience under all circumstances. 
One of the contingent conditions is time lag. The agenda-setting 
effectiveness differs with duration of media message exposure. Salwen 
(1 988), for instance, has found that the rise of public salience for the 
global issue of the environment before the peak of coverage is much 
more rapid than the decline after the peak. H e  concludes that public 
learning of media salience has a tendency to remain for some time even 
after media coverage declines (p. 130). The timing of research, thus, can 
change the results to be obtained, which is a methodological problem. 
The type of media involved in a particular research is another 
contingent condition that is set by its methodology. Palmgreen and 
Clarke ( 1977) found that national network television has relatively 
stronger agenda-setting effects for national issues than the local 
newspaper, while the local newspaper surpasses national network 
television in terms of influence for local issues. Their findings also 
involve another contingent condition--geographic proximity of the issue; 
in general, the agenda-setting effect of the media is likely to be stronger 
for national problems than for local ones (pp. 1 13-14). 
One of the contingent conditions Hill (1985) has identified is 
audience attributes. He finds that television viewers with higher 
educational levels and greater prior news awareness are susceptible to 
the media agenda-setting influences. Another contingent condition he 
suggests is research design. Pointing to the rather weak evidence of 
agenda setting in his cross-sectional surveys, he suspects that 
longitudinal experiments and quasi-experiments may reveal more robust 
effects (p. 349). 
All these contingent conditions suggest that no agenda-setting 
research may be able to substantiate the media agenda-setting effects on 
the public in all circumstances. Much more arduous is the manifest 
corroboration of the media's sheer influences on the direction--negative 
o r  positive--of public opinion, because this type of research connotes 
attitude change. 
In his theory of "agenda dynamicsH--the interaction of three 
agendas (i.e. the media agenda, the public agenda, and the policy 
agenda), Manheim (1987) emphasizes valence as one important 
dimension of the media agenda. Valence refers to "the general sense of 
favor, neutrality, or disfavor associated with the portrayal of a given 
object" (p. 502). 
As an example of support for the effective transference of general 
negativeness from the media to the public, Miller, Goldenberg and 
Erbring (1979), analyzing a highly interconnected data set of survey and 
media content, concluded that readers of papers carrying a higher degree 
of negative criticism against politicians and political institutions were 
"more distrustful of government, and also somewhat more likely to 
believe that the government was unresponsive, than were readers of 
newspapers containing less criticism" (p. 80). Moreover, through the 
examination of media coverage and public opinion of three 
technological controversies, Mazur ( 198 1 ) found evidence that an 
increase in media coverage of controversy leads to public opposition to 
the technology in question. In some circumstances, therefore, "the 
portrayal of issues or actors on the media agenda can influence 
perceptions of and judgments about those issues and actors among the 
public" (Manheim, 1987, p. 502). 
Concerning the public agenda, Weaver ( 1 97 7) presents 
psychological explanations for agenda setting, identifying three major 
factors that might determine the level of "need for orientation," which 
he and his co-researcher, Maxwell E. McCombs, first formulated. These 
factors are the degree of "(1) interest in the message content; (2)  
uncertainty about the subject of the message; and ( 3 )  effort required to 
attend to the message (including the perceived likelihood that a reliable 
source of information is available)" (p. 108). 
The first factor--message content--in this case concerns U.S. 
domestic economic issues (i.e. layoffs, recessions, etc.). Because these 
issues seem to have been salient to Americans during the 1980's U.S. 
economic downturn, Japanese economic activities may have been raised 
to a high level of interest. Downs' (1972) "issue-attention cycle" suggests 
five stages, the final being the "post-problem stage." An issue that has 
gone through the cycle almost always commands a higher average level 
of attention, public effort, and general concern than that still in the first, 
pre-discovery stage (pp. 40-41). The level of the second factor-- 
uncertainty about the issue--may be generally high, considering the 
enigmatic nature of macroeconomics for the average American. For 
instance, S. K. Johnson (1988) implies that the public generally lacks the 
sound basic knowledge about economics (p. 135). Regarding the third 
factor--public's efforts necessary to attend the message, it is highly 
implausible that the public by itself has examined and comprehended a 
variety of economic indices presented in governmental documents to 
form their own opinions. The chances are that the public most likely 
counts on the media as the second best reliable source of information. 
Most macroeconomic information relevant to Japanese economic issues 
is disseminated through the media which function as facilitators of 
understanding or interpretation of these statistical figures. This, in turn, 
alleviates the otherwise great amount of the public's efforts required to 
attend to the message. Concerning the issue of the Japanese economic 
activities, therefore, the "need for orientation" seems to be at a high 
level. 
The decline in American favorable attitudes toward Japan can 
never be ascribed solely to the media. Nevertheless, the media, as 
Weaver (1977) contends, may have the ability to change the public's 
political views and voting behavior, beyond the context of reinforcement 
caused by selective perception (pp. 1 1 6-1 7). 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the media's negative "valence" 
of the Japanese economy is influential on the public's perceptions and 
its "need for orientation" is high regarding this issue. The drastic change 
in  American public opinion of Japan in the middle of 1980s may have 
been caused by the media's change in content of coverage toward 
negativeness. 
O p i n i o n s  of J a p a n  
All negative opinions about Japan and its people may be true at 
least in part, as suggested by S. K. Johnson's (1 988) viewpoint that a 
stereotype cannot be called "entirely erroneous" ( p. 163). Deductively 
disputing each negative opinion is futile because each opinion has its 
roots in specific sustaining facts and experience encountered by opinion 
leaders.* For instance, Patrick Choate resigned as vice president for 
policy analysis at TRW Inc. which had business transactions with the 
Japanese, because of a dispute over his 1990 book, Agents of Influence, 
which attempts to reveal the influence on U.S. politics of Japanese 
lobbying (Kinsley, 1990, p. 49). In an interview held the next year, 
Choate denounced a former Fortune associate editor, one of his critics, by 
stating that the editor could not be "impartialt' because he was doing 
*A comprehensive list of "opinion leaders" regarding Japan could not be found. Therefore, 
"opinion leaders" should be regarded as writers identified by the researcher, who 
addressed negative opinions of Japan and its people in their material. 
public relations work for Japanese companies (Hodgetts, 199 1, pp. 68- 
69). If his resignation was due to the mighty pressure of the Japanese 
having business transactions with TRW Inc., as he contends, his 
statement naturally can be applied to himself: it may be impractical to 
expect unbiased opinions about Japan from him. 
On the contrary, Americans who show excessive favorability toward 
the Japanese and put extreme blame on themselves also have their 
personal experiences that have influenced their way of thinking and 
talking about Japanese people. Bill Totten (1990) argues that compared 
to the Japanese, contemporary Americans live almost exclusively for 
weekend pleasure without working hard enough, and thus are to blame 
for most of the trade friction with Japan (p. 100). Considering the fact 
that Totten is the founder and president of K. K. Ashisuto, a successful 
computer software distributor in Japan, however, it seems that he needs 
to be accepted by the Japanese society, which psychologically presses 
him to admire the Japanese and criticize Americans. 
In short, the problem is that those opinions, whether positive or 
negative, have been constructed on a one-dimensional basis where 
statistical figures, subjective observations, and personal experience 
supporting the opinions are used while contradictory facts are often 
neglected. Through literature review in this research, five general 
negative myths about Japan and its people have been identified by the 
researcher. The juxtaposition of counterarguments offers a more 
balanced perspective into the Japan issues. 
Although the primary concern of this research is the media's 
agenda-setting effect on the public, it is also conceivable that prior to the 
dissemination of information, the media per se have been affected by 
outside sources which hold those five negative myths. Examination of 
the negative myths of Japan and its people is, therefore, essential in 
order to find how dominant those opinions are in U.S. media coverage of 
Japanese economic activities. Appearance of counterarguments against 
those prevalent myths, if found in reporting, signifies the media's 
independent point of view. 
( 1) Japan is ( o r  the Japanese are) different. 
Van Wolferen ( 1986), East Asia correspondent for the Dutch daily 
NRC Handelsblad, points out two "fictions" that compose a core of the 
"Japan problem": 
First there is the fiction that Japan is a sovereign state like 
any other, a state with central organs of government which 
can both recognize what is good for the country and bear 
ultimate responsibility for national decision-making. (p. 
289) 
The second fiction that hampers the formulation of an 
effective policy toward Japan is the premise maintained by 
the United States and Europe that Japan belongs with them 
in that loose category known as capitalist free-market 
economies. (pp. 2 91-92) 
In the first "fiction," van Wolferen mentioned as evidence of a void 
of centralized political power the fact that the Japanese military 
"hijacked" the nation in the past, which led the country into the World 
War I1 devastation. It seems highly arguable, however, that there is a 
clear-cut distinction between Nazi Germany and militarized Japan in 
terms of a vacuum of centralized political power that is supposed to 
assume full responsibility and leadership for the nation, while Germany 
was and is considered to be a "sovereign nation" by him. Without 
mentioning the rise of Nazi Germany, which signifies the lack of 
centralized political power of a sovereign nation, he has legitimized that 
country's large trade surplus (p. 303). 
The second "fiction" corresponds to C. Johnson's ( 1982) 
contention that Japan is a "capitalistic developmental state" whose 
premise is the cooperative government-business relationship. Detailing 
the history of the Japanese government's supportive efforts to help its 
industries grow, he elucidates van Wolferen's point of the difference in 
conceptions of the functions of the state in economic affairs between the 
United States and Japan as follows: 
In those states that were the first to industrialize, the state 
itself had little to do with the new forms of economic 
activity but towards the end of the nineteenth century the 
state took on regulatory functions in the interest of 
maintaining competition, consumer protection, and so 
forth. . . . 
In states that were late to industrialize, the state itself 
led the industrialization drive, that is, it took on 
developmental functions. These two differing orientations 
toward private economic activities, the regulatory 
orientation and the developmental orientation, produced 
two different kinds of government-business relationships. 
The United States is a good example of a state in which the 
regulatory orientation predominates, whereas Japan is a 
good example of a state in which the developmental 
orientation predominates. A regulatory, or market-rational, 
state concerns itself with the forms and procedures--the 
rules, if you will--of economic competition, but i t  does not 
concern itself with substantive matters. For example, the 
United States government has many regulations concerning 
the antitrust implications of the size of firms, but it does not 
concern itself with what industries ought to exist and what 
industries are no longer needed. The developmental, or 
plan-rational, state, by contrast, has as its dominant feature 
precisely the setting of such substantive social and economic 
goals. (p. 19) 
Yet, in 1986 and 1987 when Japanese electronics giant Fujitsu had 
its merger negotiations with Fairchild Semiconductor, a pioneer of 
American high-technology and mainstay of Northern California's Silicon 
Valley, the United States was not exactly a "regulatory, or market- 
rational, state." According to Chapter 14 of Frantz and Collins' (1989) 
Selling Out, the Reagan administration actively discussed this deal. 
Strong opposition to the Fujitsu-Fairchild merger, which came from the 
Defense Department, the U.S. trade representatives' office, and the 
Commerce Department, reached the mass media, resulting in Fujitsu's 
retraction of its agreement to buy Fairchild, because Fujitsu was worried 
about further aggravation of American public opinion (pp. 1 73-190). 
Although antitrust investigations of the deal were conducted, this 
"market-rational" mode is not the direct motivation for oppositions 
from those angered U.S. government officials. Frantz and Collins (1989) 
mention two main reasons for this opposition: "the way the transaction 
fit so neatly into a Japanese strategy to dominate the semiconductor 
industry, and the implications that the potential dominance had for 
America's role as the world's technology leader" ( p. 1 80). Ironically, 
Fairchild had already been acquired by a giant French oil company, 
which merely sought a "financial rescue" (pp. 179, 186). The Fujitsu- 
Fairchild deal is indicative of the strong relationship between the U.S. 
government and high-technology industry for the sake of U.S. national 
security, clearly one of the country's political-economic goals. Even C. 
Johnson (1982) admits that cooperative government-industry 
relationships exist in several U.S. industrial sectors, especially the 
military-industrial complex, although he contends they are 
"exceptional" (pp. 311-12). 
Moreover, the U.S. government historically has imposed 
"voluntary restraints" on Japanese products in response to petitions of 
U.S. industries such as manufactures of apparel, steel, color TVs, and 
automobiles. For instance, when the steel lobby launched a political 
drive to reduce competition with foreign steel in 1968, the Johnson 
administration demanded that foreign nations, including Japan, agree 
to voluntarily restrict their exports to the United States. Each time the 
U.S. steel industry claimed that its foreign competitors were "unfairly" 
subsidized or  were "unfairly" dumping their products in the United 
States, the government started negotiation with foreign countries 
(Bovard, 1991, pp. 76-92). Both the United States and Japan have their 
respectively unique protective measures through cooperative 
government-industry relationships to attain their different national 
political-economic goals. 
R. J. Collins ( 1992), who lives in Japan, has observed distinct U.S.- 
Japanese cultural differences. He contends that the Judeo-Christian 
tradition has manifestly taught Westerners morally right o r  wrong 
behaviors, a distinction the Japanese fail to make. He creates the 
following hypothetical quotes that he thinks Americans and the 
Japanese respectively are expected to utter: 
AMERI-THINK (upon waking up with a new and different 
partner in bed): "I'm sorry about last night; i t  meant a lot 
to me." 
JAPAN-THINK (upon waking up with a new and different 
partner in bed): "Let's get out of here before somebody sees 
us." (p. 48) 
The question, however, is exactly for what he or  she is apologizing. 
Verbalization alone does not necessarily demonstrate human moral 
integrity. If R. J. Collins is talking about "adultery," then, morality 
dictated by the Judeo-Christian tradition will be called into question, 
because the apology of the American in the story becomes a tool to 
liberate him or her from their "sin." 
Similarly, van Wolferen (1989) offers his personal opinion of 
cultural differences between Western nations and Japan as if he saw no 
desirable conception of a "utopian future" in Japan: 
The ideology of Japaneseness differs, of course, from 
ideologies that seek to harness political energies to the 
realisation of a utopian future. . . . Unlike Western 
ideologies, it is not something that overrides the immediate 
demands of society, and so it is not something the 
individual can appeal to in order to justify thought or 
behaviour going against the grain of social expectations. (p. 
248) 
Underlying their comments on the Japanese culture seems to be 
the concept of Japanese group orientation that always has been accented 
in the West. This concept easily leads to teamwork which is supposed to 
characterize Japan's management style; conformity to group norms 
which engender a both rigid and orderly society; and existence of no 
individuals who take ultimate responsibility. While admitting that the 
Japanese tend to subordinate their individualism to the group more 
than Westerners do, Reischauer (1 988) points out the existence in Japan 
of nonconformists (e.g. powerful gangs, skid rows, etc.) and the strong 
desire for self-expression and freedom from social restraints (e.g. social 
emphasis on personal hobbies, revolts against social norms, etc.). He 
warns of overemphasis on stereotypes: 
Many observers have noted that the emphasis on hard work, 
individual drive, and economic achievement, pridefully 
described as the 'Protestant ethic' in the West, is even more 
characteristic of the Japanese, who have no Christianity, let 
alone Protestantism, in their background. These traits, in 
fact, are strongly characteristic of all the peoples of East Asia- 
-the Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese as well as the 
Japanese--who derive their underlying culture from ancient 
China and its Confucian attitudes. (p. 170) 
The controversy over individualism vs. groupism, when talking 
about the Japanese compared to Americans, converges into each opinion 
leader's subjectivity over whether his or her various contradicting 
observations should be categorized as rules or exceptions. Strong 
community cooperation during disaster periods is frequently seen in the 
United States, and, as Reischauer (1988) argues, the Japanese, in general, 
place a great deal of emphasis on individual "will power" (p. 169). To 
his eyes, "Japan is drifting further from most Asian lands and closer to 
Western norms, and this is likely to continue to be the situation as far 
ahead as one can see" (p. 366). 
The conclusion of this opinion category is that Japan is politically, 
economically, and culturally different from the United States and the 
rest of the world. Similarities between U.S. and Japanese cultures are 
often less accentuated or absolutely neglected. 
( 2 )  The Japanese have a master plan for economic 
dominance of the world. 
According to Frantz and Collins (1989), "no country has carried 
out its investments with the strategic mandate that motivates the 
Japanese" (p. 7) and "the Japanese have demonstrated a grim 
determination to undergo any sacrifice to obtain economic supremacy at 
home and abroad" (p. 20). Van Wolferen ( 1986) also agrees that Japan 
as a nation has been committing itself to the pursuit of its priority of 
unconstrained economic growth: 
After the postwar industrial reconstruction, which as an 
obvious choice for the nation hardly required strong 
centralized political control, the political assumption 
emerged that unlimited industrial expansion must be 
Japan's first priority. No politician made an issue out of 
this. The bureaucracy, which had been left almost entirely 
intact during the Occupation, was to administer this policy. 
(P* 290) 
Van Wolferen's logic is that a void of strong political power enables 
the body politic to mobilize people toward its first priority of infinite 
economic expansion. Yet, if it is true that Japan lacks "strong 
centralized political control," it seems next to impossible for Japan to 
put into practice its master plan for global dominance with unlimited 
economic expansion in an  organized manner, no matter how strong the 
bureaucracy is. For instance, pointing out Japan's nationally committed 
industrial policy which is "not trade policy or tax policy, but a strategic 
plan that affects every facet of the nation's economic system," Dietrich 
( 1 99 1) presents an absolutely opposite assumption: 
Similarly, all the elements of the Japanese system are 
necessary and important, but some are more important. 
Without a strong central state and a higher professional 
bureaucracy, the Japanese could not do it. The state is the 
prime mover of Japanese industrial policy. I t  is the center 
of the nation's economic system. . . . Through legislative 
and administrative initiatives, the state directly affects 
industrial policy, and i t  indirectly conditions industrial 
policy by influencing culture, education, management, and  
finance. And don't forget: no strong central state, no higher 
bureaucracy, no industrial policy. It's as simple as that. (p. 
99) 
This "master plan" assertion may have derived from the analysis 
of the Japanese bureaucracy, especially MITI. Prestowitz (1989), like C. 
Johnson, singles out the power MITI holds on Japanese microeconomic 
activities--authorization of building plants, supermarkets, or department 
stores, suspension of the antitrust laws and declaration of cartels, 
establishment of industrial standards, and licensure of Japanese 
technology (pp. 238-39). Moreover, Japanese industries per se have a 
tendency to obey what is called "administrative guidance" offered by the 
various ministries, which signifies a certain nationwide direction-- 
probably economic supremacy. 
However, since they do business in the arena of world economy, 
the Japanese political-economic power structure hardly affects any 
country's economic policy in a direct way. Even if the presumption 
holds true that Japan has much stronger bureaucracy-business 
relationships than the United States, the Japanese administration has no 
capability to moderate and harness beyond the fabric of U.S. domestic 
regulations the economic activities of the Japanese working outside the 
country for the purpose of its economic dominance. 
Also important is the recognition of simple economics. As long as 
U.S. domestic needs for Japanese components and products persist in a 
relatively constant manner, lowering the value of the dollar merely 
inflates the dollar value of the U.S. trade deficit, although the physical 
amount of Japanese exports to the United States, of course, will decrease. 
Moreover, Ohmae (1990) states that "anything below 300 yen to a dollar 
is a bargain exchange rate" for real estate prices (p. 164). It is an  
absolutely normal economic condition that people tend to be willing to 
purchase "bargains." 
As for manufacturing, the appreciation of yen theoretically made 
it tough for Japanese industries to directly export to the United States, 
which naturally forced them to produce goods outside Japan. This has 
induced direct investment of setting up new production facilities, buying 
existing factories, and opening offices. Because of the Japanese unique 
system called "keiretsu" (economic groups in which major banks and 
trading companies form networks of companies), various other related 
Japanese industries came to the United States along with these 
manufactures. 
Suppose that this exclusive business custom of "keiretsu" 
constitutes part of the Japanese master plan. Yet, the European Union 
as well as the U.S. administration have already launched numerous 
regulations to break up this business custom by devising the standard of 
local production content. For instance, Honda currently claims that 
their automobiles manufactured in the United States have a domestic 
American content of 75 percent, and thus are eligible for exporting to 
European countries (Emmott, 1993, p. 78). Needless to say, other 
Japanese manufacturers, regardless of industry, are following suit to 
enhance their products' local content. The Japanese package of 
economic supremacy, if any, may be on the verge of cracking. 
Situational evidence seems to have been collected to verify this 
negative opinion, which suggests no direct corroboration has been made 
about the existence of the Japanese nationwide committed plan for 
economic dominance. The status quo of Japanese economic activities 
seems to reflect natural economic theories, not some Japanese master 
plan for economic supremacy in the world. 
( 3 )  The Japanese will eventually get to control America's 
( o r  the world's) economic life. 
In 1989, the Mitsubishi Estate Corporation announced that it had 
purchased a controlling interest in the Rockefeller Group. Some 
American citizens' reference to the huge Christmas tree of the Rockefeller 
Center symbolically hinted at their worry about the Japanese economic 
influence over the future of the U.S. economy. Yet, the often overlooked 
fact is that the Rockefeller Group then owned a small portion of the 
Center with 71% spun off to the public in the form of a real estate 
investment trust, which endowed Mitsubishi only a 15% stake in the 
Center (Partner, 1992, p. 7). As evidence of Mitsubishi's low controlling 
power, the Christmas tree has never been replaced by a tiny Japanese 
"bonsai." 
Typically found is the fear of Japanese threats to the U.S. 
economy. For instance, Frantz and Collins (1989), ascribing the 1987 
"Black Monday" crash at  the New York Stock Exchange to Japanese 
investors, states that this event was "a lesson in the perils of the rising 
levels of foreign investment in the United States, particularly the 
concentrated investments being made by the Japaneseq' (p. 9). Even if 
their contention is assumed to be true, Japan is so intricately linked to 
the U.S. economy that it alone cannot avoid "being controlled," because 
immediately after the crash, the Tokyo stock market also considerably 
lowered the average stock price. Two years later, the country's "bubble 
economy" (i.e. hyperinflation of stock and property prices in the late 
1980s) began to burst, which eventually led Japan to plunge into its 
current recession. 
The pessimism toward the U.S. future also flares up discussion of 
possible Japanese economic control. Analyzing the trend of the past U.S. 
government budget deficits, Figgie and Swanson (1992) project that in 
1995 its cumulative debt will reach $6.56 trillion. They refer to three 
major past examples: hyperinflation in Germany after World War I, 
budget crisis in England in 1976 which asked the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for help, and inflationary economies of several South 
American countries. Using these examples as what may happen to the 
United States in the future, they assert that the United States will go 
bankrupt at that point because interest payments on this debt--some 
$619 billion--"will amount to 85 percent of all income taxes and more 
than the government collects in taxes from individuals" (p. 68). They 
sketch the following scenarios in this prediction: 
In one scenario, which I call Death by Hyperinflation, prices 
spiral out of control and the dollar loses value--first by the 
month, then by the week, and eventually by the hour. In 
the other scenario, which I call Death by Panic, traders and 
investors on the world's financial markets literally put 
America out of business. 
Probably, we'll get a taste of both hyperinflation and 
panic, but the shooting victim hardly cares whether he's 
dead of a .45- or a 357-caliber bullet. Hyperinflation or 
market panic or any combination will finish off America and 
Americans. (p. 75) 
Touting that "credit," on the basis of which the U.S. government 
can borrow money both from American and foreign investors, has its 
limits, Figgie and Swanson (1992) insist that the U.S. federal government 
now rectify its way of expenditures. Especially, based on the fact that as 
of the end of 1991, foreign investors held 12.3% of U.S. Treasury 
securities (i.e. $443 billion), they prognosticate that Americans will lose 
the economic sovereignty of their country (pp. 93-95). 
Their common recognition is that the United States is already a 
poor nation which has lost the ability to compete with other nations. 
Despite the barked-at poverty of the United States, reflected by the huge 
U.S.-Japanese savings differences, the Bank of Japan published in 1988 
that the U.S. savings rate was 14.7 percent and the Japanese rate was 
16.7 percent, a mere 2-percentage-point gap, because the United States 
and Japan were simply using different accounting systems (Ohmae, 
1990, pp. 145-46). 
In addition, it is impossible for the Japanese to control the U.S. 
economy no matter what may happen. Sullivan (1992) presents two sets 
of statistical figures. First, Japan currently owns about 2% of total U.S. 
assets, which is projected to rise to 4% by the year 2000. Second, over 1 
million Americans will come to work for Japanese companies by the year 
2000, which is 1% of the 100 million U.S. workforce. He asserts that 
these figures are clearly too small for the Japanese to exert their 
controlling power on the economic destiny of a country as enormous as 
the United States ( p. 45). 
The frequently forgotten fact behind numerous positive and 
negative stories about Japan's economic success is the comparatively low 
profit margins of Japanese businesses operating in the United States. 
Most U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese corporations have shown extremely 
low annual profitability in terms of return on investment, although they 
are not attempting to evade tax to the U.S. government. The general low 
profitability of Japanese businesses operating in the United States is 
primarily due to their long-term orientation (Sullivan, 199 2, pp. 1 13 - 
118). 
The chief economic reason why Japanese businesses could sustain 
low profitability is that in the late 1980s, an immense amount of 
seemingly cheap capital engendered by its "bubble economy" of 
domestic investment fad on stocks and properties was readily available 
to them. However, as its name suggests, the "bubble economy" per se 
lacks substance, being merely a nominal economy. Now that it is 
definitely over, Emmott ( 1993) prophesies the future of the troublesome 
Japanese economy: 
The high level of capital investment was an aberration, 
caused by the bubble economy and the illusion that capital 
was cheap. In the future, it will be looked at as a costly 
mistake. At best, this excess will hamper corporate Japan; at 
worst it will injure it quite severely. Put more mildly, it 
means that now that capital is short, new investment plans 
cannot be as ambitious as before. (p. 190) 
Burstein ( 1993) likewise foresees that Japanese businesses will 
considerably raise the prices of their products to fulfill new demands o n  
companies--the enhancement of profitability of enterprises ( p. 1 68). 
Although he still thinks of Japanese businesses as creating new challenges 
to the U.S. industries in a positive context of competition, it is sure that 
they will lose most of their traditional price competitiveness in the U.S. 
market. As a symptom of this prediction, more and more Japanese 
corporations have recently begun operating in the red, with some going 
bankrupt. 
Given that capital is no longer cheap, Japanese companies that 
made enormous investments in the United States in the 1980s now must 
be eager to withdraw some or most of them in order to compensate for 
profit losses. Because of current excessive appreciation of the Japanese 
currency, however, they simply cannot do it. If they did now, 
outlandish damage would be inflicted on their current tight finances. 
"Corporate Japan" seems to be no longer a threat to the U.S. economy, 
or  a t  worst, i t  may be at death's door. 
(4 )  Japan is a protectionist and unfair country (or the 
United States is a free and fair trader).  
Fallows ( 1989, p. 42)  states that "Japanese and Korean politicians 
now complain about American 'protectionism,' but how protectionist 
can a country with a $10 billion monthly trade deficit really be?" 
Although he is using the gross U.S. trade deficit with Japan to describe 
how open the U.S. market is, the 1990 IMF statistics show that the 
Japanese per-capita imports of American products--$430--was already 
higher than the U.S. counterpart--$374--in 1990 (JETRO, 1991 b, p. 10). 
Concealed behind the gross trade figure is the fact that the Japanese 
population is approximately half as large as the U.S. counterpart. 
If the gross U.S.-Japanese trade balance is used as evidence, Japan 
is judged to be an unfair protectionist country. On the contrary, if the 
concept of per-capita consumption is applied to US.-Japanese trade 
issues, the United States will have to buy more products from Japan, 
because the comparison of 1990 per-capita GDP--$23,801 for Japan and 
$2 2,062 for the United States (JETRO, 1992 b, p. 5 2)--apparently shows 
that an individual Japanese is buying American products beyond a U.S.- 
Japanese bilateral per-capita equilibrium of economy. 
"Free trade" has always been a judgment foundation on which the 
U.S. administration accuses other foreign countries for their trading 
practices. According to Bovard ( 199 1 ), however, President Nixon seemed 
to espouse a diagonally inverse trading policy: 
Richard Nixon's anti-textile import declarations helped him 
win the presidency in 1968. . . . A few month later, Nixon 
threatened to perpetuate the U.S. military occupation of 
Okinawa if the Japanese government did not further restrain 
textile exports. In 197 1, Nixon raised the stakes by 
threatening to penalize Japan under the World War I 
'Trading with the Enemy Act' if Japan did not agree to 
export curbs. When Japan finally succumbed to U.S. 
pressure, White House press secretary Ron Zeigler announced, 
'President Nixon wants to express his personal appreciation 
for the cooperation and understanding of our negotiating 
partners and his belief that these voluntary agreements lay 
the groundwork for even more positive contributions toward 
friendly cooperation in the future.' (p. 37) 
Although the above policy was held by the country which kept 
touting the principle of free trade, this incident should not have 
happened, because sitting in the center of free trade policy is still Adam 
Smith, the author of Wealth of Nations, to whom both van Wolferen 
(1986, p. 302) and Fallows (1989, p. 47) refer. As a matter of course, 
Smith's free competition emphasizes the minimization of a state's 
intervention into people's economic activities. This is an outright case 
of U.S. econonationalism. Even Choate (1990), who holds a Ph.D. in 
economics, attacks the "globalization" thesis such as Ohmae's, stating 
that "the dollars held by Japan could be used to buy American exports 
rather than American assets" (p. 157). His contention should be called 
"managed trade" rather than "free trade." 
Suppose that Japan's trade practices have become similar to those 
of other major economic powers. According to the Des Moines Register, 
Laura Tyson, chairwoman of Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, said 
that if the above situation were realized, "Americans could sell up to $12 
billion more worth of U.S.-made goods there [Japan] each year, adding 
up to 240,000 more U.S. jobs" (First shot, 1994, p. 5A). However, $12 
billion subtracted from $50.2 billion--the 1993 U.S. trade deficit with 
Japan--still leaves $38.2 billion, which is approximately equal to the 
199 1 counterpart. No explanation of this residual number was offered, 
which, in turn, seems to validate Ohmae's explanation that existing 
needs primarily determine the amount of trade between nations. 
Tyson's comment is a simple indication that even if the Japanese trade 
system is different from that of the United States, there must be other 
reasons for most of the massive U.S. trade deficit than Japan's alleged 
protectionism. 
As the United States became more protective, the concept of "fair 
trade" emerged to address bilateral or multilateral trade issues. Krooth 
and Fukurai (1990) point out that because the proportion of American 
imports affected by U.S. import restrictions rose from 9 percent in 1981 
to 15 percent by 1986, the United States faced "the dilemma of speaking 
out for free trade, yet simultaneously erected barriers to the goods of 
others" (pp. 178-79). This new concept, Bovard (1991) asserts, is little 
different from protectionism: 
Some people may believe that there is a fundamental 
difference between fair trade and protectionism. But, 
fairness has nothing to do with the U.S.'s 8,000 tariffs, 3,000 
clothing and textile import quotas, auto quotas, sugar, dairy, 
peanut, cotton, beef, and machine tool quotas. . . . Not one 
trade barrier in twenty has any relation to a reasonable 
concept of fairness, yet fairness is perennially invoked to 
cover all trade barriers with its blessings. (p. 306) 
According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary ( 1 990), 
"fair" implies "an elimination of one's own feelings, prejudices, and 
desires so as to achieve a proper balance of conflicting interests" (p. 
445). Yet, "fairness" defined by U.S. congressmen embraces biased 
subjectivity. For instance, pointing out that Rep. Richard Gephardt in 
1985 declared that ". . . as a referee as well as a star player in the world 
trade game, the United States has a special responsibility to enforce fair 
trade rules for an open world trade system," Bovard ( 1991) states that 
"Congressmen have appointed themselves as umpires of international 
trade, and anything that displeases a sufficient number of congressmen 
is automatically unfair" (p. 279). Therefore, whether an import quota is 
judged as protectionist or not depends solely on "the nationality of the 
politicians who impose it" (p. 272). 
For instance, the Des Moines Register presents a list of the countries 
and trading groups which the U.S. administration judges to have erected 
the "most harmful" trade barriers to American products: 
Arab League, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, 
European Union, Finland, Guatemala, Gulf Cooperation 
Council, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, independent states of the 
former Soviet Union, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela. (Japan is 
top target, 1994, p. 4A) 
There are three points to be noted about this list. First, almost the 
rest of the world is simply "protectionist" to the United States. Second, 
the controversy over Japan vs. the West seems meaningless, since the 
European Union is included. Third, in order to answer the "level playing 
field" question (e.g. Japan is playing the trade game by different rules), 
it should be judged whether the United States o r  the rest of the world 
upholds uniquely different rules. 
Such an  econonationalistic viewpoint is typically found in the 
works of Prestowitz who, for instance, contends that the United States 
"permitted Japanese exports into the U.S. market and Japanese 
investment in the U.S. while the same was denied to the U.S. in Japan" 
(1 987, p. 10). Although he used the word "permit," which connotes that 
the United States is unilaterally doing the Japanese a favor, reality seems 
to reside in between "permission" and "plead." Partner (1992) tells a 
different story: 
Fact: More than half of the state governors have been on 
missions to Japan to encourage Japanese investment in their 
states. Fact: the sellers of Rockefeller Center approached 22 
different Japanese firms before accepting an offer from 
Mitsubishi Estate. (p. 48) 
While opinion leaders who embrace negative opinions about Japan 
generally seem to assume that the amount of the U.S. trade deficit with 
Japan squarely signifies Japanese "unfairness" and American "fairness, " 
there is a fundamental question about whether the U.S. trade deficit per 
se is something worth making a big fuss over at all. For the nationality 
of products, only whose transnational physical flow the macroeconomic 
accounting system captures, may not be a distinct basis for calculating 
trade balance, given the current trend of world-wide economic 
globalization. Ohmae (1 990) presents the following thought-provoking 
question: 
Is IBM Japan an American or a Japanese company? Its work 
force of 20,000 is Japanese, but its equity holders are 
American. Even so, over the past decade IBM Japan has 
provided, on average, three times more tax revenue to the 
Japanese government than has Fujitsu. What is its 
nationality? Or what about Honda's operation in Ohio? Or 
Texas Instruments' memory-chip activities in Japan? Are 
they "American" products? If so, what about the cellular 
phones sold in Tokyo that contain components made in the 
United States by American workers who are employed by the 
U.S. division of a Japanese company? (p. 10) 
If IBM Japan moves its products from Japan to the United States 
for some reason, they are recorded as Japanese exports to the United 
States, no matter what the company's nationality is. The underlying 
logic may be that these products have "added value" created by the 
Japanese people. If so, the objective of the "buy American" movement 
makes little sense. For instance, Americans tend to buy "American" 
products, say, Chrysler automobiles, some of which can hardly be judged 
as "American" due to the nationality of components. They shy away 
from buying all foreign-labeled products such as Honda cars, some of 
which are being produced in the United States with the majority of 
components made in this country. 
The more global the world economy, the less effective the 
macroeconomic accounting system. Ohmae ( 1990) adds, "The deficit is 
an illusion created by accounting systems that are tragically out of date, 
systems that measure only the physical flow of goods across national 
borders" (p. 143). Whatever negative connotation the words "deficit" 
and "debt" have, all business transactions, whether trade or  direct 
investment, are settled in the agreement of parties, not by nations. As is 
obvious, no interest is paid for most foreign investment, although it is 
recorded as "debt." 
(5 )  Japan is (o r  the Japanese are)  harmful. 
To Frantz and Collins (1989), Japan's automakers are "the 
ultimate Trojan horse, and American cities and states are eagerly 
wheeling them inside" (p. 126). Also, "Right now, Hawaii is a petri dish 
where the dangers of Japanese investment in real estate are festering" (p. 
279). 
Therefore, it is strongly recommended by van Wolferen (1986) that 
the United States swiftly take effective measures against Japan in order 
"to stave off a n  otherwise seemingly inevitable confrontation that would 
harm the non-communist world and destroy what remains of the 
international free trade system" (p. 301). In a similar vein, Fallows 
(1989) maintains that the United States should impose limits on Japan's 
excessive economic expansion, which is representative of its destructive 
habits that are "potentially more harmful to the rest of the world than 
America's are" (p. 42). He describes the expansion of Japan's economic 
power as follows: 
The expansion is one-sided because Japanese business does 
to other countries what Japan will not permit to be done to 
itself. It is destructive because it will lead to exactly the 
international ostracism that Japan most fears, because it 
will wreck the postwar system of free trade that has made 
Japan and many other nations prosperous, and because it 
will ultimately make the U.S.-Japanese partnership 
impossible to sustain. (p. 41 ) 
There are a variety of harms the Japanese have allegedly scattered 
in the United States. One of the negative economic factors is export of 
unemployment. Choate (1990) contends that the real number of new 
jobs created by foreign investment is quite low, because 95% of those jobs 
created in 1988 were "made up of existing jobs in U.S. companies that 
were taken over by foreign investors" (p. 149). The question is, however, 
whether all the U.S. companies that were merged could have survived 
without financial rescue of foreign investment, and thus those "existing" 
jobs really could have kept existing. 
A short-circuited logic is that any competition with foreign 
companies deprives Americans of their jobs. If so, the surge of the U.S. 
trade deficit and foreign investment in the United States should have 
had a strong, positive correlation with an increase in the country's 
unemployment rate. Nivola (1993) points out that between 1982 and 
1987, during which the trade imbalance enlarged, 14 million new jobs 
were created in the Untied States, and the unemployment rate 
plummeted from 9.5 percent to 5.7 percent, "reaching the lowest level in 
fourteen years" (p. 11). He denies the allegedly strong connection 
between the trade deficit and the national unemployment rate: 
To be sure, workers in particular industries were severely 
injured by a loss of market share here and overseas. But on 
the whole, economists stressed that international trade, 
however unbalanced, had resulted in  more American gainers 
than losers. If the trade deficit shifted national employment 
among industries, eliminating the deficit would also result 
in sectorial dislocations with no guarantee of an  increase in 
total employment. (p. 11) 
Another harm is that, according to Frantz and Collins (1 989), 
Japanese investment generates only cheap, assembling jobs in the United 
States, keeping high-value production at home. Moreover, Japanese 
M&As (mergers and acquisitions) deteriorate American R&D (research 
and development) by reducing its funding (p. 16 1 ) . However, Sullivan 
(1 992) shows contradictory statistical figures: while corporate R&D 
spending per worker in the United States is approximately $470,000, 
Japanese-owned firms spend $1.5 million per worker (p. 45). 
Japanese influence on U.S. politics is still another concern. For 
instance, Frantz and Collins (1989) accuse the Japanese of attempting to 
shape U.S. policies and affect opinions through several methods: paid 
lobbyists, political campaign contributions by their American 
subsidiaries, PR and advertising campaigns, charitable contributions, and 
contributions to American think tanks and educational institutions by 
Japanese-financed foundations. Choate (1 990) reveals a complete list of 
Japan's registered foreign agents in the United States in the appendices 
of his book, arguing that the Japanese are now controlling the U.S. 
domestic policy to pursue their economic interests. In addition to 
Japanese influence on the U.S. politics, he details an example of how 
American media programs have been influenced by the U.S.- Japan 
Foundation which was established with the objective of facilitating 
mutual understanding and friendship between the United States and 
Japan: 
Public television and radio shows like those funded by the 
U.S.-Japan Foundation are taken seriously by viewers and 
listeners because they present views that are considered to be 
objective and untainted by commercial considerations. By 
underwriting 'soft' programs that concentrate on improving 
US.-Japan relations and increasing Americansv 
'understanding' of Japan, Japanese sponsors are able to 
project a highly credible, favorable impression of their 
country. This, of course, is the nature--and the goal--of good 
propaganda, and the reason that Japan puts up the money. 
(P* 193) 
Choate ( 1990) maintains that Americans are vulnerable to 
propaganda because most Americans know little about history, 
economics, social sciences and foreign languages ( p. 1 8 1 ). Whether or 
not his contention on Americans' naivete to persuasive messages due to 
their ignorance is true, recent surveys such as the opinion poll annually 
conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry show that their favorable 
opinions of Japan have been deteriorating. American perception of 
Japan is clearly going astray from the direction that those Japanese 
"propaganda" campaigns, if any, espouse. As Kinsley ( 1990) says, 
Choate's contention of Japanese propaganda success may be "laughable" 
(P* 6 ) .  
Admittedly, Japanese firms did real harm such as job 
discriminations to the U.S. society. Although that harm should not be 
excused, it does not present a whole picture of Japanese investment. 
Possibly, the Japanese have both good and bad influences to Americans, 
and  vice versa. 
The longitudinal opinion poll annually conducted by the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry shows that contrary to its declining trend in 
the first half of the 1980s, the portion of Americans who held 
unfavorable views of Japan steadily increased since 1986 (Gallup and 
Newport, 1991, p. 11). From the basic standpoint of agenda setting (i.e. 
correlation between public and media agendas), it can be predicted that 
this opinion change will correspond to a change in media coverage: If 
the negative "valencet' of the media agendas can function regarding the 
transference of negativeness to the public, the 1986-1 990 period should 
show intensified negative elements i n  reporting, compared t o  the 198 1 - 
1985 period. 
I t  is also conceivable that outside sources exist to affect the media 
in the process of information dissemination. Five negative myths of 
Japan and its people are opinions from outside sources. Based o n  the 
theory of agenda setting, the intensity of negativeness (i.e. the more 
frequent appearance of five negative myths than contradictory opinions 
to those myths on an  unattributed basis) will be stronger i n  the 1986- 
1990 period than in the 1981-1985 period. In addition, because of each 
magazine's financial limitation which may constrain its investigative 
ability, the three U.S. news weeklies will differ in terms of dependency on 
outside sources that hold negative opinions of Japan and its people. 
R e s e a r c h  O u e s t i o n s  a n d  H y p o t h e s e s  
According to the Gallup Poll Monthly, 77% of respondents 
interviewed considered Japan to be an economic threat to the United 
States (Gallup and Newport, 1991, p. 15). Also, 68% of respondents in 
another Gallup Poll survey believed Japan's trade policy with the United 
States to be "unfair" (Moore, 1993, p. 20). Although there are 
contradictory facts that indicate no threat of Japanese economic 
activities and the U.S. "unfair" trade policy, the public's perception of 
Japan is negative, according to these polls. 
Qualitatively analyzing the media coverage of Japan, S. K. 
Johnson ( 1988) states that "war memories and war imagery are not 
necessarily something receding into the distant past; they can be 
harnessed to up-to-date causes" (p. 36). In the context of the U.S.- 
Japanese trade dispute, the depiction of the Japanese as aggressors to 
the U.S. economy has been repeatedly utilized by the American media 
for more than a decade. The U.S.-Japanese economic relationship is 
presented as a "war." Whatever the appropriateness of this kind of 
expression as a mirror of the Japanese economy, the rhetorically-fixed 
image of the Japanese economic "invasion" of the United States or the 
rest of the world is expressed in the concept of "trade wars" or "economic 
wars." Thinking reversely, the framework of "war" might serve to invoke 
American wartime imagery of the Japanese and keep aggravating 
American public attitudes toward the Japanese. Since "warw-related 
words themselves connote mutual antagonism, the emphasis on this 
agenda--U.S. "war" with Japan--seems to embrace negativeness when 
transferred from the media to the public. 
As already examined, research indicates that the media seem to be 
more influential on the formation of American public opinion of this 
issue than reality per se which consists of statistical figures. For the 
public most likely obtains understanding and interpretations of 
economic information through the media, instead of looking to 
governmental documents, given the esoteric nature of economics. Since 
confusion in understanding of macroeconomics is seen among the 
average public, as S. K. Johnson (1988) indicates, the public seems to 
strongly depend on the media in this area. From the standpoint of 
agenda setting, a strong correlation between media coverage and public 
opinion can be expected. It can be predicted, therefore, that print media 
coverage turned in a more strongly negative direction in the 1986-90 
period than in the 1981-85 period. 
In terms of publication characteristics, Lacy, Fico and Simon 
(1 991 ) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that the performance 
of prestige newspapers, such as the New York Times and Washington Post, 
was generally better than that of other high circulation newspapers. A 
further assumption underlying this hypothesis is that "circulation size 
translates into editorial resources that are then available for researching 
stories to make them as fair and balanced as possible" (p. 366). If this 
assumption is applied to the three U.S. news weeklies (i.e. Time, 
Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report), it can be inferred that Time 
will perform in a more balanced way than Newsweek, which will perform 
more so than U.S. News and World Report, although the causal effect of 
subscription o n  balance cannot be directly tested. According to the 
Audit Bureau of Circulation, the subscription circulation is 4,203,991 for 
Time, 3,240,131 for Newsweek, and 2,307,569 for U.S. News and World 
Report (Troshynski-Thomas and Burek, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 403; Vol. 2, pp. 
1536,1560). 
Therefore, from the standpoint of agenda-setting theory and the 
circulation assumption, the research addresses the following three 
general research questions and six hypotheses: 
RQ1: Are there any significant differences in the U.S. news 
weeklies' coverage of Japanese economic activities 
between the 1981-1985 and 1986-1990 periods? 
RQ2: Are there any significant differences intrinsic to each 
of the three news weeklies in terms of coverage of the 
Japanese economy? 
RQ3: What are the interaction effects between period and 
publication differences? 
H1: The coverage of Japanese economic activities in the 
1986-1 990 period is more slanted toward calcification 
of the "war" context than that in the 1981 -1 985 
period. 
H2: The lower the subscription circulation of a news 
weekly, the more "warv-related words it uses in the 
coverage of the Japanese economy. 
H3: The coverage of Japanese economic activities in the 
1986-1 990 period shows more negative opinions from 
opinion leaders with less balance between negative 
and positive opinions than in the 1981-1985 period. 
H4: The lower the subscription circulation of a news 
weekly, the more negative opinions from opinion 
leaders with less balance between negative and 
positive opinions it  utilizes in the coverage of the 
Japanese economy. 
H5: The coverage of Japanese economic activities in the 
1986-1 990 period overrepresents people who hold 
negative opinions than that in the 1981-1985 period. 
H6: The lower the subscription circulation of a news 
weekly, the more it overrepresents people who hold 
negative opinions concerning the Japanese economy. 
Interaction effects between period and publication variables will be 
examined with no hypotheses. Also, if a significant difference is found in 
the "publication" variable, a posteriori test to further probe into exactly 
which news weeklies are different from the rest will be used to confirm or  
reject HZ, H4, and H6. 
M e t h o d o l o g y  
This research seeks quantification of changes in the way the U.S. 
weekly news magazines covered the Japanese economy. Surveys can 
surely elicit the current trend of reporters' opinions of this issue, but 
surveys on this issue would have to be cross-sectional or "one-shot," 
which makes unfeasible the comparison of two periods. 
O n  the other hand, an analysis of selected cases affords this type of 
comparison. Yet, there is plenty of room for subjectivity in selection of 
material, judgment of cases and conclusion of research, because 
researchers are allowed to use convenience samples for this type of 
"insight-stimulating" exploratory analysis. Therefore, content analysis 
with probability sampling seems to be the best research method for this 
study's objective. Appendix A offers a sample of a content analysis 
sheet. 
(1) Sampling 
The parent population of this research was all news articles 
concerning Japanese economic activities, which appeared in three U.S. 
news weeklies-- Tim e, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report--between 
198 1 and 1990. The inclusion of news articles which constituted the 
actual sampling frame, however, was based on the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature that classifies articles under various subject entries. 
Although there is another sampling method to make a population 
exactly correspond to a sampling frame (i.e. sampling of issues), one of 
the most troublesome obstacles with this method is judgment of news 
articles in terms of relevance to this research. Since a particular article 
can be classified into more than one category at the same time (e.g. 
politics and economics), criterion reference guides are helpful to achieve 
the maximization of objectivity in the news article selection process. 
The following is a list of criteria subject entries that were used to search 
for the sampling frame of articles regarding the Japanese economy: 
Japan -- Commerce, Commercial policy, Commercial 
treaties and agreements, Economic conditions, 
Economic history, Economic policy, Economic 
relations, Industries. 
United States -- Commerce--Japan, Commercial treaties and 
agreements-- Japan, Economic relations-- 
Japan. 
Investments, American -- Japan 
Investments, Japanese 
Foreign propagandist -- United States [Japan lobby] 
Lobbyists and lobbying -- United States [Japan lobby] 
The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature contains See and See 
also references that make cross-references possible. All entries under See 
and See also references in the above subject entries were examined to 
find additional material. Most of the time, however, a particular article 
was classified into more than one entry. In order to avoid counting the 
same article more than once, titles and dates of all relevant news articles 
were written down by news weekly and year, which necessitated 30 news 
article selection sheets--three news weeklies times 10 years. Appendix B 
shows an example of a news article selection sheet. 
There are two values in the "period" variable (i.e. 1981-1985 and 
1986-1 990) and three values in the " publication" variable ( i.e. Time, 
Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report), which creates a 2 x 3 
contingency table for each research variable of the news content (See 
Section 2). The assumption of normal distribution requires the 
minimum sample number of 30 cases for each sub-population or 
stratum. One contingency table contained six cells which represented six 
conceptually different sub-populations. In addition, this research 
utilized only parametric statistics. Following a more conservative 
method, 35 articles were randomly selected from each of the three news 
weeklies in the 198 1-85 period, and 35 from each in the 1986-90 period, 
using computer-generated random numbers. Thus, the gross sample 
number of news articles was 2 10. 
This sampling method is called "disproportionate stratified 
sampling," and was selected because relative homogeneity could be 
equally expected of each stratum in terms of each weekly magazine's 
hypothesized performance and each period's hypothesized tendency. 
Detailed explanation of this sampling method and  validity of its use in  
this research is in Appendix C. Further precise analyses of the validity of 
the sample size are offered later in the Results section. 
( 2 )  Research variables of the news content  
The research used the following three variables in the examination 
of the news content: 
1) The number of "waru-related words. 
2) The number of opinion leaders1 negative opinions 
subtracted from the contradictory, positive opinions, 
both of which appeared on an unattributed basis. 
3)  The number of people who expressed their unfavorable 
opinions against Japan (or favorable opinions for the 
United States or other countries) subtracted from those of 
people who supported Japan (or accused the United 
States or other countries). 
The first variable is concerned with the problem of calcification of 
war imagery. Hikins (1983) refers to two types of reality--"social reality" 
and "reality per  se," and defines these as follows: 
Social realities are the product of linguistic interaction 
among social groups and result when the group reaches a 
consensus about some object of discourse. They are 
predominantly subjective in nature, since the criteria of the 
truth or falsity of a social reality is whether or not it is 
coextensive with the consensually arrived at opinions of 
individual perceivers. On the other hand, reality per se 
comprises a realm external to the perceiving subject, where 
'externalf is to be taken as implying independence from and 
temporal priority to socially constructed attitudes, beliefs, 
and values. (p. 388) 
Hikins' distinction between these two types of reality seems to be 
susceptible to philosophical counterarguments of what constitutes the 
ultimately objective reality, because the supremacy of "reality per self 
over "social reality" is considerably unstable. Yet, he ( 1983) contends 
that the impinging of "reality per se" upon social groups may "serve to 
independently confirm or deny the validity or usefulness of a particular 
social reality" (p. 388). This seems to indicate the importance of careful 
analysis of various other external "facts." 
For instance, Hikins (1983) argues that the U.S. nuclear attacks at 
the end of World War I1 were launched because of an American 
commitment to the rhetoric of "unconditional surrender," which had 
served as a means of unifying Allied nations and their people, and "had 
by 1945 metamorphosed into a body of public opinion which operated 
to constrain policy makers" (p. 380). Illustrating the fact that the 
Truman administration finally accepted the Japanese surrender which 
was not "unconditionalt1 in nature (i.e. failure of dethronement of the 
Japanese Emperor) and the public was generally indifferent to it once 
peace became reality, he states that "the rhetorically created social 
reality of unconditional surrender was salient to Americans (or a t  any 
rate to most Americans) as long as there was a war in progress" ( p. 397). 
The media has repetitively used "waru-related words in reporting 
Japanese economic activities. Hikins' concept of two realities indicates a 
danger of confinement of policy makers as well as the public's salience to 
a particular social rhetoric. The metamorphosis of the "war" imagery 
into a body of public opinion, therefore, can fixate administrative 
policies, depriving freedom of policy makers. As an example, the U.S. 
administration has recently come to resort to the so-called "Super 301" 
which specifically refers to new provisions included in the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Bhagwati (1990) explains the 
content of this legislation: 
Super 301 essentially requires the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), on schedule, to prepare an inventory 
of foreign trade barriers, establish a priority list of countries 
and their unreasonable practices, and then set deadlines for 
their removal by the foreign countries and, should they fail 
to comply, for decisions on retaliation by the United States. 
(P. 3) 
The problem with "Super 301" is at least two-fold: unilateralism 
and GATT-illegality. First, the United States seems to play "the roles of a 
self-appointed 'trade cop' and 'trade czar."' "The world trading regime," 
however, "should not be built on the assumption that any one player, no 
matter how dominant, can impose its own rules, unilaterally claiming 
social legitimacy for them" (Bhagwati, 1990, pp. 36-37). Second, the use 
of the threatened tariff retaliation is GATT-illegal, especially in that this 
measure refuses GATT-postulated multilateral trade negotiations for the 
settlement of disputes (pp. 33-34). In this respect, exclusion of "waru- 
related words, which may have worked to engage the U.S. trade policy 
makers in adoption of one-sided, unilateral measures, seems to create a 
better recognition of Japanese economic activities, resulting in a 
mutually beneficial trade partnership. 
The second variable attempts to delve into the effects of opinion 
leaders. As discussed earlier, all strongly resentful opinions against 
Japan and its people generally ignore contradictory facts. When the 
media provide these opinions in coverage, the question arises about their 
treatment. 
From the general semantics standpoint, Hayakawa (1 964) 
identifies three types of sentences that are used for the purposes of 
exchange of information: reports, inferences, and judgments. Report 
sentences are factual and verifiable, excluding inferences and judgments 
as far as possible. Inference sentences are statements about unknown 
matters made on the basis of already known things. And judgment 
sentences are expressions of the writer's approval or disapproval-- 
favorable or unfavorable opinions-of whatever he  or she is describing 
(pp. 38-50). 
Lowry ( 1986) has expanded Hayakawa's classification to nine finer 
types of sentences in order to examine the construct validity of the 
category system. He incorporates three other dimensions: attribution, 
label (i.e. appearance of inferential key words), and favorability. The 
category system is as follows: 
Report sentence/attributed; 
Report sentencehnattributed; 
Inference sentence/labeled; 
Inference sentencehnlabeled; 
Judgment sentence/attributed/favorable; 
Judgment sentence/attributed/unfavorable; 
Judgment sentence/unattributed/favorable; 
Judgment sentence/unattributed/unfavorable; 
All other sentences. (p. 574) 
All negative opinions from opinion leaders are, to a more or less 
extent, their judgments, given the fact that all the statements have been 
created unfavorably toward Japan or its people. The usage of these 
opinions on an unattributed basis constitutes Lowry's eighth category, 
"Judgment sentence/unattributed/unfavorable," which was perceived by 
respondents as the most biased of all (Lowry, 1986, p. 578). There is a 
high probability, however, that strongly negative opinions presented by 
opinion leaders, when used unattributed in the structure of news, can be 
taken as given facts, because as Hayakawa ( 1964) suggests, "implied" 
favorable and unfavorable judgments contained in sentences by 
neglecting contradictory facts are generally hard to discern from sheer 
reports. At any rate, the comparison in number between these negative 
opinions and contradictory, positive opinions on an unattributed basis 
shows how strongly an article reflects negative opinions from those 
opinion leaders. 
Finally, the third variable addresses the issue of balanced 
representation of opinions in quotes. Following Lowry's ( 1986) category 
system, people's quotes which show their disapproval compose his sixth 
category, "Judgment sentence/attributed/unfavorable." Given the fact 
that people quoted for their comments are not randomly selected and 
selection of them depends on the judgments of reporters and editors, 
they are never a "good" sample representative of the population of 
public opinions. Accordingly, it is desirable to use the equal number of 
people for at least both sides of an argument to achieve balance in terms 
of equal opportunities for opinions. 
( 3 )  Criteria for the three research variables 
A pilot study of randomly sampled 30 news articles was conducted 
to set up criteria for the aforementioned three research variables. Five 
articles were chosen from each segment of the previously selected 35 
articles from each period and each magazine. 
The first variable addressed the problem of calcification of 
Japanese economic transactions with the United States or the rest of the 
world in the "war" context. All "warH-related words were classified into 
the following four categories, which showed respectively different 
contexts of "war": 
1. General imagery of war: war, warfare, battle, army, 
troops, weapon, bombshell, cannonball. 
2. Reference to World War 11: Pearl Harbor, 1941, World War 
11, Pacific War, 1 945, Zero warplane [fighterplane], 
kamikaze, U.S.S. Missouri, MacArthur, (U.S.) victory, 
(Japanese) surrender. 
3. Japanese offense: challenge, attack, assault, invasion, 
foray, inroad, encroachment, marauding, conquest, 
aggression, victory, beat, win, triumph. 
4. U.S. defense: beleaguered, beaten, lost. 
This list presents most representative forms of words (i.e. singular 
form of noun, abstract form of noun, root form of infinitive, etc.). 
Therefore, the singular form, "war," includes its plural form, "wars." The 
infinitive, "win," contains its past tense or past participle, "won." Also, 
the abstract form, "aggression," embraces its actor's form, "aggressor(s)." 
For the second variable, the balance between negative opinions 
from opinion leaders and positive opinions contradictory to those 
opinions was explored. Five negative myths about Japan or its people 
were previously found in the "Literature Review" section. Category 1 
addressed Japanese economic, political, and cultural differences which 
were oftentimes exemplified by the comparison of two countries' various 
practices or custom. The negation of this opinion was an emphasis of 
similarity. Category 2 connoted that the Japanese, as a whole, 
committed themselves to economic supremacy which was preplanned. 
Description of the Japanese as an economic-supremacy-driven nation, as 
well as the usage of such words as "plan," "scheme," or "drive," were 
considered to embrace this opinion. Its denial indicated no Japanese 
national efforts or plan for their economic dominance. Category 3 
focused on the Japanese economic control of or threat to the Untied 
States or the rest of the world. Its contradictory opinion was centering 
on U.S. economic strength or Japan's economic downturn. Category 4 
delved into how protectionist or  unfair Japan was and how fair the 
United States was. The opposite of this opinion was the 
acknowledgment of the fact that the United States was also a 
protectionist country. Finally, Category 5 stressed harmfulness of Japan 
or its people. For instance, blames of unemployment were frequently 
cast on the Japanese. Its reverse opinion introduced the good they 
brought about. The following are illustrative direct quotes from the 
three news weeklies to demonstrate examples of affirmation (i.e. 
negativeness) and negation (i.e. positiveness) of each negative opinion: 
1. Japan is (or the Japanese are) different. 
(Affirmation) The clash over microchips also went far 
beyond commercial concerns in pitting two vastly 
different cultures [U.S. and Japanese cultures] against 
each other. 
(Negation) The two nations [the United States and 
Japan] also share a common commitment to political 
democracy and individual liberties. 
2. The Japanese have a master plan for economic 
dominance of the world. 
(Affirmation) The intensity of the Japanese drive for 
global supremacy in electronics was brought to light last 
year when 2 1 executives of two Japanese companies were 
charged with conspiring to buy U.S. computer secrets 
from an undercover agent of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
(Negation) The jump in exports [of Japan] apparently 
results from an increased demand for the products, not 
from any major efforts to boost foreign sales. 
3. The Japanese will eventually get to control America's (or  
the world's) economic life. 
(Affirmation) Now that supremacy [American 
dominance in the world's electronic technology] is being 
threatened by a formidable and frightening competitor: 
Japan. 
(Negation) Neither Japan nor any other country 
imminently threatens to gain economic control over the 
U.S., whose nonbank multinational corporations have 
assets totaling well over $5 trillion. 
4. Japan is a protectionist and unfair country (or the 
United States is a free and fair trader). 
(Affirmation) Not only do the Japanese slap taxes on 
imported cigarettes to boost some of their prices 40% 
above Japanese brands, but they have also laid down a 
phalanx of other barriers. 
(Negation) U.S. indignation at Japan's trade obstacles is 
tainted by hypocrisy, given that America has erected 
formidable barriers of its own. 
5. Japan is (or the Japanese are) harmful. 
(Affirmation) But it is clear that Japan's financial 
growth-at least in the short run--will come a t  the cost of 
the U.S. and Europe just as its industry and commerce 
grew at their expense. 
(Negation) National [National Steel] already has highly 
efficient plants, and the addition of Japanese technology 
should make the company even stronger. 
Calculation of the number of negative opinions subtracted from 
that of positive opinions gave an article a positivehegative number or a 
zero for this variable. A positive number signified overemphasis of 
positiveness (i.e. negation of negative opinions from opinion leaders), a 
negative number that of negativeness (i.e. affirmation of negative 
opinions from opinion leaders). A zero indicated a perfect balance. 
Third, the problem of attribution was examined. Individuals who 
appeared in news articles were judged based on whether their statements 
showed outright accusations of or clear support for the United States or  
Japan. If a person argued for both sides or  made vague comments, he or 
she was eliminated from this analysis, because in this research seeking 
"balance," the statistical result remained the same. Thus, the researcher 
judged that this elimination would cause no serious problems. Also, 
collective unnamed sources, such as "Some U.S. officials say. . ." were 
excluded, because it was impossible to determine how many people were 
referred to in that sentence. The following are illustrative direct quotes 
from the three news weeklies to demonstrate examples of four types of 
attribution: accusation of the United States, support for the United 
States, accusation of Japan, and support for Japan: 
Accusation of or unfavorability toward the United States. 
A Japanese businessman: 'You [Americans] are selling us 
down the river! I had to send part of my production to 
Hong Kong this year. Don't you realize that we think of 
the United States as our greatest ally? And now you are 
crucifying us! Why? Why don't you tell people in 
Washington this? They've got to do something!' 
a Support for or favorability toward the United States. 
Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge: (Upholding 19 8 7 
U.S. trade sanctions of some $300 million worth of tariffs 
on Japanese products) 'You can't rely on words. You 
have to rely on actions.' 
Accusation of or unfavorability toward Japan. 
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative David MacDonald: 'I 
see a crisis in late spring or summer. The problem is the 
closed Japanese market itself. We are not talking about 
the Japanese restraining exports, we are talking about 
them opening up their own domestic market.' 
Support for or favorability toward Japan: 
One Tokyo official: 'Restrictions on  imported-cigarette 
sales have already been eased so dramatically that 
nothing further could be done without risking jobs of 
domestic tobacco growers,' . . . 
As a result, each news article had a positive/negative number or a 
zero, which was the number of people favorable to Japan (including 
those unfavorable to the United States) minus those unfavorable to 
Japan (including those favorable to the United States). Thus, a positive 
number signified favorability to Japan, and a negative number 
unfavorability; a zero was indicative of perfect balance. 
(4 )  Stat is t ics  
The research is two-fold: changes in the U.S. news weeklies' 
coverage of Japanese economic activities concerned with the United 
States in terms of the "period" difference (i.e. 1981-85 and 1986-90 
periods) and the "publication" difference (i.e. Time, Newsweek, and U.S. 
News and World Report). Two-way ANOVA was used to probe into mean 
differences for both types of research interests. For research variables 
(i.e. dependent variables) that showed any significant differences for the 
"publication" variable (i.e. independent variable), the Tukey's T method 
was used to find specifically which cell means were different from the 
rest. 
Weighting was also used to make all news articles equivalent in 
terms of length. The unit was one page that normally constituted three 
columns. Therefore, if an article was two pages long, all results were 
divided by two; if two columns, 2/3 was used as a divisor. Although 
overall impression to the reader might have been different due to the 
existence of pictures and the differences in type, this method was 
expected to give a general weighting of news articles. 
R e s u l t s  
Thirty-five articles were randomly sampled from each category 
sorted out by two independent variables--period and publication. In 
total, 210  articles were selected from the sampling frame of 415. Table 1 
shows segmentation of news articles found in this research. 
Table 1: Number of News Articles about the 
Japanese Economy Found in Three U.S. 
News Weeklies between 1 981 -1 990 
Table 2: Validation of Sample Sizes 
Sigma: estimation by range16 
Error: error range fixed in k2.596 or 546 
no: requisite sample size for infinite population 
n: requisite sample size for finite population 
(1) A posteriori validation of the sample size 
Because determination of the sample size before conducting 
research contains "educated" inferences that are less precise than a 
posteriori inferences, it seems necessary to further examine its validity 
with more sophisticated procedures after attaining solid sample 
statistics. Appendix D offers general explanation and equations of 
sample size determination, which are presented in a statistics textbook 
by Berenson and Levine ( 1992, pp. 343-5 1 ). 
Of the three research variables, the number of "waru-related words 
was considered the most important variable because of its uniqueness in 
Table 3A: Raw Mean Number of "Warw-Related 
Words by Period and Publication 
l~aaazines 11981-198511986-19901 TOTAL 1 
1 Time I 0.77 1 1.83 1 1.30 I 
1 TOTAL I 1.1 5 I 2.32 I 1.74 I 
F (for main effect of period) = 12.81 7, d.f. = 1, 204, p < .O1 
Newsweek 
U.S. News 
F (for main effect of publication) = 2.29 1, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05 
F (for two-way interaction) = ,193, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05 
the media coverage of the Japanese economy. Therefore, the variable of 
i 
1.03 
1.66 
the number of "warH-related words was chosen as the touchstone of 
sample size determination. 
2.49 
2.66 
Table 2 displays precalculations of components necessary to 
1.76 
2.1 6 
calculate minimum required sample sizes. In the error rate of *2.5% or  
5% of range, i t  could be concluded that with 95% confidence, the sample 
size of each sub-population, 35, was sufficient for this research. 
( 2 )  Hypothesis testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were concerned with the problem of 
calcification of "war" imagery in the print media's coverage of the 
Japanese economy. Table 3A shows raw mean numbers of "waru-related 
words by period and publication. Since the two-way interacting effect of 
these two independent variables was not significant (F = .193, 
d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05), period and publication effects could be analyzed 
independently. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the coverage in the 1986-1990 period 
would be more biased toward the "war" context than that in the 198 1- 
1985 period. The mean number of "warM-related words in the 1981-1985 
period was 1.15, while the 1986-1 990 counterpart was 2.32. Two-way 
Table 38: Weighted Mean Number of "Warw-Related 
Words by Period and Publication 
I U.S. News I 1.53 1 2.92 1 2.23 I 
Ti me 
Newsweek 
1 TOTAL I 1.1 1 I 2.60 I 1.85 I 
F (for main effect of period) = 1 4.175, d.f. = 1, 204, p < .0 1 
F (for main effect of publication) = 2.500, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05 
F (for two-way interaction) = 5 6 2 ,  d.f. = 2, 204, p > -05 
0.72 
1.08 
ANOVA test revealed the difference was significant (F  = 12.81 7, 
d.f. = 1, 204, p < .0 1 ). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was confirmed. 
1.75 
3.1 2 
The effect of subscription circulation differences on the use of 
1.23 
2.10 
"waru-related words was addressed in Hypothesis 2. I t  was expected that 
the less subscribed news weekly would present more "warH-related words. 
Although the mean number of those words increased as the subscription 
circulation decreased, the differences were not statistically significant 
(F = 2.291, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was rejected. 
To eliminate the effect of article length, weighting was used. Table 
3 B  exhibits weighted mean numbers of "warv-related words. The period- 
publication interacting effect was not significant (F = .562, d.f. = 2, 204, 
p > .05). For the "period" variable, the mean number of those words 
used in the 1981-1985 period was 1.1 1, and that in the 1986-1990 was 
2.60, the difference of which was statistically significant (F = 14.175, 
d.f. = 1, 204, p < .01). On the other hand, the differences among 
publications were not statistically significant (F = 2.500, d.f. = 2, 204, 
p > .05). Therefore, just the same as analysis of raw mean numbers, per- 
unit (i.e. one page) comparison indicated the significant "period" effect 
on the usage of "waru-related words. 
Table 4A: Raw Mean Number of Opinion Balance 
by Period and Publication 
- - -- I Time - 0 . 3 7  1 -0 .77  
-0.95 -1 .10  
F (for main effect of period) = .287, d.f. = 1 
F (for main effect of publication) = 3.677, c 
F (for two-way interaction) = .947, d.f. = 2 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 dealt with the balance regarding the print 
media's presentation of five types of opinion leaders' negative opinions 
and positive opinions contravening those negative opinions in their 
report of Japanese economic activities. As stated earlier, the balance was 
defined as the number of positive opinions minus that of negative 
opinions in each article. A zero, thus, signified the ideal position of 
perfect balance in presentation of opinions. 
Table 4A presents the results of raw mean numbers of balance in 
presentation of positive and negative opinions. Period and publication 
effects were independently examined since the two-way interacting effect 
was not significant (F = .947, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the 1986-1990 coverage of the 
Japanese economy would have contained more negative opinions from 
opinion leaders, or be less balanced than the 1981-1985 counterpart. 
Although the mean numbers of the two periods followed the prediction 
(i.e. -0.95 for 1981-1985 and -1.10 for 1986-1990), two-way ANOVA test 
showed the difference was not significant (F = .287, d.f. = 1, 204, p > .05). 
Hypothesis 3, therefore, was not supported. 
The increased use of negative opinions from opinion leaders in the 
Table 48: Weighted Mean Number of Opinion Balance 
by Period and Publication 
I~aaazines 11981-198511986-19901 TOTAL I 
1 Time I -0.38 1 -0.74 I -0.56 I 
1 TOTAL I -0.83 I -1.22 I -1.02 I 
F (for main effect of period) = 1.468, d.f. = 1, 204, p > .05 
Newsweek 
U.S. News 
F (for main effect of publication) = 4.889, d.f. = 2, 204, p < -01 
F (for two-way interaction) = 1.174, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05 
less subscribed publication was presumed in Hypothesis 4. The mean 
-11.22 
-0.88 
differences were statistically significant (F = 3.677, d.f. = 2, 204, p c .05), 
but Newsweek utilized negative opinions the most of the three news 
-2.23 
-0.68 
weeklies. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not accepted. Tukey's T method, a 
-1.73 
-0.78 
posteriori multiple comparison procedure, corroborated that at a = .05, 
the mean difference between Time and Newsweek was significant while 
the other two comparisons were not significantly different. 
Weighted mean numbers of balance between negative and positive 
opinions are displayed in Table 4B. The period-publication interacting 
effect was not statistically significant (F = 1.174, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05). 
The mean number for the "period" variable in the 198 1-1 985 period was 
-.83, and that in the 1986-1990 was -1.22. This difference was not 
statistically significant (F = 1.468, d.f. = 1, 204, p > .05). Although the 
differences among publications were statistically significant (F = 4.889, 
d.f. = 2, 204, p < .01), the mean number of Newsweek was the highest in 
the negative, which was the same result as the analysis of raw mean 
numbers. Here, Tukey's T method verified that a t  a = .05, the mean 
number for Newsweek was significantly different from the other two news 
weeklies. Therefore, per-unit (i.e. one page) comparison indicated that 
Table 5A: Raw Mean Number of  Attribution Balance 
by Period and Publication 
TOTAL 
I Time 1 -0.31 1 -0.11 1 -0.21 1 
I -0.3 9 I -0.25 I -0.32 I 
F (for main effect of ~eriod) = .609, d.f. = 1, 204, p > .05 
- 
Newsweek 
U.S. News 
F (for main effect of bublicition) = 1985, d.f. = 2, 204, p > 
F (for two-way interaction) = .032, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05 
Newsweek significantly differed from Time and U.S. News and World 
-0.29 
-0.5 7 
Report in terms of the balance in presentation of negative and positive 
opinions. Put another way, Newsweek carried negative opinions from 
-0.20 
-0.43 
opinion leaders the most of the three news weeklies per page. 
I 
-0.24 
-0.50 
The problem of balanced representation of people attributed was 
stated in hypotheses 5 and 6. This research variable was the number of 
people whose quotes were accusatory of Japan (or supportive for the 
United States) subtracted from that of people whose quotes were 
supportive for Japan (or accusatory of the United States). Thus, a zero 
signified the perfectly balanced representation of public opinion. 
Table 5A presents raw mean numbers of people attributed in 
quotes whose opinions were either favorable or unfavorable toward 
Japan or the United States. The "period" and "publication" effects 
could be separately examined because of no significant two-way 
interacting effect (F = .032, d.f. = 2, 204, p > -05). 
Hypothesis 5 anticipated that the coverage of the Japanese 
economy in the 1986-1990 period would be leaning toward 
overrepresentation of people who held negative opinions, than the 198 1 - 
1985 counterpart. Two-way ANOVA revealed that the mean difference 
Table 58: Weighted Mean Number of Attribution Balance 
by Period and Publication 
between these two periods was not significant (F = .609, d.f. = 1, 204, 
TCrrAL 
-0.14 
Newsweek 
U.S. News 
I 
TOTAL 
/ 
p > .05). Moreover, contrary to the hypothesis, the 1986-1 990 period 
1986-1990 
-0.18 
Magazines 
Ti me 
had the lower mean value (-0.25) than the 1981-1 985 period (-0.39). 
1981-1985 
-0.09 
F (for main effect of period) = 1.182, d.f. = 1, 204, p > .05 
F (for main effect of publication) = 1.445, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05 
F (for two-way interaction) = .807, d.f. = 2, 204, p > -05 
-0.44 
-0.88 
-0.47 
Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was rejected. 
The "publication" effect on this research variable was dealt with in 
-0.2 1 
-0 .30 
-0.23 
Hypothesis 6, which prognosticated that the less subscribed news weekly 
-0.33 
-0.59 
I 
-0.35 
would have the higher mean in terms of representation of people 
embracing opinions accusatory of Japan or supportive of the United 
States. Although the results followed the prediction, the mean difference 
among the three publications was not statistically significant (F = .985, 
d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05). Hypothesis 6, hence, was not confirmed. 
Weighted mean numbers of public opinion representation in 
quotes are displayed in Table 5B. The period-publication interacting 
effect was not statistically significant (F = .807, d.f. = 2, 204, p > .05). For 
the "period" variable, the mean number of the 1981-1 985 period was 
-0.47, and that of the 1986-1990 period was -0.23. This difference was 
not statistically significant (F = 1.182, d.f. = 1, 204, p > .05). Also, the 
mean number of the 1986-1 990 period was actually lower than the 198 1 - 
1985 counterpart, which was the same result of the case of raw mean 
numbers. Although sample statistics showed that the less subscribed 
publication represented more people who held opinions unfavorable 
toward Japan or favorable toward the United States, the difference 
among publications was not statistically significant (F = 1.445, 
d.f. = 2,  204, p > .05). 
C o n c l u s i o n  
The three U.S. news magazines presented more "warN-related words 
in the 1986-1990 period than in the 1981-1985 period. This finding 
corresponded to the change in trend of American opinion of Japan: 
Contrary to its decreasing trend in the 198 1-1 985 period, American 
unfavorability toward Japan increased in the 1986-1990 period. 
However, neither attributed nor unattributed negative opinions that 
appeared in coverage of the Japanese economy showed a significant 
increase in the 1986-1990 period. These results indicate that if the three 
U.S. news weeklies were effective in setting an agenda for the public 
regarding the Japanese economy, the cause of the change in American 
public opinion might be "waru-related words rather than attributed and 
unattributed negative opinions. Therefore, the influence on the public 
of those simple and negative "warn-related words, which have been 
uniquely applied to the depiction of Japanese economic activities, may 
be stronger than that of opinions presented by news magazines. 
This research focused on the media's "valence" in terms of effective 
transference of the media's unfavorability of certain objects o r  topics to 
the public. Although the transference has not been universally 
supported, it does occur in some circumstances. In the context of the 
media and public agendas, issue-specific agenda setting is generally 
unidirectional from the media to the public (Manheim, 1987, p. 506). 
Because the American public seemingly depends heavily on the media 
regarding information of Japanese economic activities, one possible 
reason for the increase in the portion of Americans who held unfavorable 
opinions of Japan in the 1986-1990 period is the media's increased use 
of "waru-related words that innately connote mutual antagonism. 
The media's agenda-setting effect on the public is basically 
measured by the correlation between the frequency of media coverage of 
an issue and the salience of the issue in the minds of the public. Stated 
differently, agenda setting is a calcification process of particular angles of 
an issue. The calcification of the wartime imagery in the three U.S. news 
magazines was intensified in the 1986-1990 period, in which readers were 
expected, on average, to see more than two "war"-related words both per 
article and per page. The threshold of the number of those words to 
invoke fear and distrust of Japan in the American public is surely 
unknown. However, the "valence" of the media's patterned choice of 
those words when describing the Japanese economy may be negative 
enough to transfer to the public not only this issue's salience but also 
negativeness. Repeatedly appearing key words may become a 
determining factor based on those words' direction--negativeness or 
positiveness. 
Focusing on the interdependency between real events and 
stereotypes, in which good relations contribute to favorable images, and 
vice versa, S. K. Johnson (1988) advocates a multiplicity of images that 
makes it difficult for one nation to predominantly hold a particular 
stereotype on another nation. She asserts that while each of the images, 
whether positive or negative, contains a kernel of truth, "their 
multiplicity and impermanence should make us cautious about 
accepting any one of them as either fixed or wholly accurate" (pp. 170- 
7 1 ). In this respect, the media's choice of "warff-related words contrary 
to real happenings may influence the trend of American public opinion 
against Japan. Changes in the U.S.-Japanese economic realities no more 
than simply signify an expansion of their bilateral relationship in the 
context of macroeconomics. 
Two types of balance--opinion balance and attribution balance-- 
were examined in this research to see whether they may have been 
relevant to the conceivable agenda-setting effect on the public. The 
result is that neither seem to have had anything to do with agenda 
setting. One is the balance between negative opinions from opinion 
leaders and positive opinions contradictory to those opinions. The three 
news weeklies generally presented more negative opinions than positive 
opinions. However, the total mean numbers for both periods were close 
to the balancing point. This signifies little influence on the media of 
opinion leaders who embrace negative opinions on the media. Also, this 
indicates the media's high commitment to balance. 
Another balance is the representation of sources who demonstrated 
positive or  negative opinions toward Japan. Although the overall result 
demonstrated the media's slight overrepresentation of negative opinions, 
the mean number was close to zero, and therefore close to balance. 
An underlying assumption was that the subscription circulation 
could be translated into the amount of resources available to probe into 
certain topics. Therefore, it was expected that the performance of Time 
would be better than Newsweek, and Newsweek's performance better than 
that of U.S. News and World Report. 
This fundamental supposition was not statistically confirmed in 
any of the three research variables. Whether or not a vehicle maintains 
a good performance does not seem to depend on its allocation of 
resources as determined by circulation. Rather, any difference in 
coverage may simply draw on each publication's editorial policy or  each 
reporter's predisposition. 
One thing to be noted, however, is that Newsweek showed a 
significantly higher negative per-article mean than Time in terms of 
balance between negative opinions from opinion leaders and 
contradictory positive opinions. The per-page comparison revealed that 
the negative mean of Newsweek was significantly higher than Time and 
U.S. News and World Report. Stated another way, Newsweek's editorial 
policy may be more susceptible to or accepting negative opinions from 
opinion leaders than the other two news weeklies. 
Time's article, titled "Yellow-Peril Journalism," is suggestive of the 
U.S. media's recent tendency in coverage of Japanese business. Ellis Cose 
(1989), author of this article, asserts that "xenophobia" seen in 
journalism during a time of "yellow peril" panic over Japanese 
immigration is the root of the recent media's outcry against Japan. The 
following is the conclusion of this news article: 
Dismaying though the financial trends concerning Japan 
may be, economics alone cannot explain the current media 
attitude any more than the immigration levels of the early 
1900s could explain the Nippon hysteria of those years. But 
modern-day Japan is hardly a suitable candidate for press 
pity. American reporters have a duty to be tough-minded in 
their exploration of Japanese business practices. Yet, 
publications have all too frequently reached for easy 
headlines and analyses that evoke some of the worse aspects 
of the yellow-peril era. That is unfortunate. For, to the 
extent that coverage of Japanese business is reduced to the 
1989 equivalent of 'Japanese plan invasion of industrial 
fields,' journalism will be that much more diminished and 
readers that much less informed. (p. 79) 
D i s c u s s i o n  
In 1941, the Pacific War broke out on the so-called "Day of Infamy" 
of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The war ended three 
years and nine months later, which reopened U.S.-Japanese diplomatic 
relations. Both countries have since expanded their political, economic, 
military, and cultural relationships with no conspicuous threat of 
tension felt on either side of the Pacific. 
On the other hand, the U.S. media have kept touting for more 
than a decade that the United States and Japan are already engaged in 
another type of confrontation--"trade wars." It is not clear who initiated 
the application of "warw-related words to describe the US.-Japanese 
economic relationship. However, the U.S. media have contributed to 
make the public familiar with those words. "Trade wars" have become 
rhetorically-fixated realities in a society in which winning is a must. At 
the same time, both the U.S. and the Japanese national economic 
policies are now heading toward unilateralism (i.e. one-sided judgments 
over fairness) and protectionism (e.g. retaliatory measures such as high 
tariffs). 
The uniquely Japanese version of rhetorically-created "social 
realities" concerning its international trade is "The Japan That Can Say 
No," a three-volume series written by Shintaro Ishihara, Japanese Diet 
member, and other authors. Although Ishihara ( 1991 ) allocated one 
whole chapter to the explanation of various cases in which Japan should 
say "yes" to U.S. demands in trade negotiations (pp. 94-102), the 
primary objective of these books is to teach Japanese to say "no" to the 
United States. One example of his advocacy statements is as follows: 
If we try to bend with the wind, making concessions and 
patchwork compromises as usual, the tempest will abate for 
a while, only to recur with even greater force. We must not 
flinch in the face of pressure. The only way to withstand 
foreign demands is to hold our ground courageously. No 
more temporizing. (p. 1 14) 
Generally speaking, the Japanese people have a tendency to avoid 
apparent, unpleasant confrontations in any circumstances by making 
such vague statements that foreign negotiators often cannot see what 
they mean by "yes." (Ishihara, 1991, p. 49). In this sense, his 
recommendation might create more meaningful and fruitful U.S.- 
Japanese relationships. However, Americans' "racial prejudice," which 
he believes is the root cause of " Japan-bashing," is referred to so 
frequently with almost no mention of the Japanese counterpart that 
Japanese naysaying in itself has been calcified as a goal for the sake of 
"no." This action is justified by pointing out that alleged American 
racism is a valid reason for Japanese nationalism. 
When slushy opinions based on a few superficial facts such as 
Ishiharavs gain wide popularity, they can become reasons for the 
justification of actions driven by nationalism. Therefore, the Japanese 
naysaying, no matter how meaningless it is in bilateral trade 
negotiations, is readily rationalized, because Ishihara's distorted image of 
Americans lets the United States deserve the irrationality of this 
Japanese political action. 
As far as Japanese print media also utilize "warH-related words and 
other patterned words, comparison of U.S. and Japanese news weeklies 
should be made. Although this research did not compare U.S. and 
Japanese news weeklies, Shukan Bunshun, Shukan Asahi, and Shukan 
Yomiuri may be the Japanese equivalent to Time, Newsweek, and U. S. 
News and World Report. Also, other types of media should be explored as 
part of a transnational comparison since as Palmgreen and Clarke's 
(1977) research shows, the agenda setting effect differs between TV and 
the print media. 
Although this research focused on how the five negative myths 
about Japan and its people were incorporated into reportage, there 
existed other opinions that were not classified. Exploration of those 
other opinions could present a more comprehensive picture of the 
media's coverage of Japanese economic activities. 
The final recommendation for future research is the tight 
combination of survey and content analysis. For instance, the G2 
economic summit between the U.S. and Japanese administrations 
normally creates a great deal of news stories in both countries. By 
conducting two surveys before and after news coverage, and a content 
analysis of TV and newspaper coverage, causality may be indicated if 
significant difference is found. Comparing suwey and content analysis 
results can enhance the quality of research much more than the general 
analysis of correlation. 
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Appendix A: Content Analysis  Sheet 
A.  Article Number 
B.  Name of Publication 
C .  Period of Article 
I Period I Check One I 
D .  Size of Article (Number of columns / 3)  
E .  Number of War-Related Words 
War 11, ~acifi; War, 1945, 
Zero warplane, kamikaze, 
U. S.S. Missouri, MacArthur, 
(U.S. ) victory, (Japanese) 
surrender] 
3. Japanese Offense 
[challenge, attack, assault, 
invasion, foray, inroad, 
encroachment, marauding, 
conquest, aggression, 
victory, beat, win, 
triumph] 
4. U.S. Defense 
[beleaguered, beaten, lost] 
4- 
TOTAL 
Page 1 
F. Number of Negative Opinions from Opinion Leaders 
G .  Number of People Attributed 
3. Japanese control of 
U.S. [World's] economy 
4. Japan--protectionist, 
unfair country 
5.  Japan/ Japanese-- 
harmful 
TOTAL 
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I 
A p p e n d i x  B: News A r t i c l e  S e l e c t i o n  S h e e t  
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A p p e n d i x  C: S t r a t i f i e d  S a m p l i n g  
A stratified sample is a probability sample that involves the 
following distinctive two-step procedures: 
1. The parent population is divided into mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive subsets. 
2. A simple random sample of elements is chosen 
independently from each group or subset. (Churchill, 
1991, p. 559) 
Therefore, the requirement of "simple random sampling" that 
"each population element has not only a known but an equal chance of 
being selectedt' (Churchill, 1991, p. 545) is applied independently to 
each subset of the second sampling procedure. In other words, the only 
one requisite to all elements is that of "probability sampling," in which 
"each population element has a known, nonzero chance of being 
included in the sample" (p. 538). It should be noted that each case does 
not necessarily have to have an equal probability of selection in case of a 
stratified sampling method. 
In this research, a fixed sample of 35 articles was randomly chosen 
from each stratum for the sake of normality assumption, equal 
representation of each sub-population, and convenience of analyses. 
Thus, this stratified sampling is "disproportionate," which, according to 
Churchill (1991), involves "balancing the two criteria of strata size and 
strata variability." "With a fixed sample size, strata exhibiting more 
variability are sampled more than proportionately to their relative size. 
Page 4 
Conversely, those strata that are very homogeneous are sampled less 
than proportionately" (p. 567). As for this research, relative 
homogeneity was equally expected of each stratum because of each 
magazine's hypothesized performance and each period's hypothesized 
tendency. Therefore, there seemed to be no problem with this sampling 
method that took equal representation more importantly than relative 
proportion. 
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A p p e n d i x  D: Sample  Size D e t e r m i n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  Mean  
In determining the sample size for estimating the true population 
mean, three factors need to be specified in advance: error, confidence 
level, and population standard deviation. To develop a formula for 
determining the sample size, the following formula of z-score, Z , for 
sampling distributions of the sample mean from a normal population 
should be first introduced: 
where X is the sample mean, is the population mean, ox is the 
population standard deviation, and no is the sample size. Multiplying 
both sides by the denominator of the right side, the above equation 
results in the following one: 
The difference between the sample mean and the population mean in 
the right side is called the sampling error. Therefore, the sampling error, 
e , is defined as 
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solving this equation for no, the following equation results as the formula 
to be used for sample size determination without considering the finite 
population correction factor: 
In this research, however, random sampling was conducted six 
times--one for each finite sub-population that was segmented out, based 
on its publication and period. When the population is finite, which 
necessitates involvement of the finite population correction factor, the 
sampling error is given by the following modified equation: 
where n is the sample size for the finite population, and N is the finite 
population size. Solving this equation for n ,  
Squaring both sides, 
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Using the equation (no) for the sample size determination without 
considering the finite population correction factor, 
Therefore, the following formula results, which seeks to determine 
the sample size for the finite population: 
Unfortunately, in most cases such as this research, ax is unknown 
for lack of previous research data. As a n  educated guess, if a normal 
distribution is assumed, the range is considered approximately equal to 
60, (i.e. &3ax around the mean), so that ax can be estimated as 
range/6 for a normally distributed variable. 
The smaller the sampling error e and the higher the confidence 
level, the more accurate the estimation. In this research, the proportion 
of e was fixed in &2.5% of the range, and the z-score of 1.96 for 95% 
confidence level was chosen. 
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